

January 18, 2001

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
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Washington, DC 20555-0001



ULNRC-04353

Gentlemen:

**DOCKET NUMBER 50-483
CALLAWAY PLANT
UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY
OPERATING LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST:
"UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION REGARDING
INSTALLATION OF LOAD TAP CHANGING TRANSFORMERS TO
PROVIDE OFFSITE POWER TO THE SAFETY RELATED ELECTRICAL
BUSES"**

- (References: 1. ULNRC-04220, dated April 17, 1999
2. ULNRC-04239, (FSAR Update) dated May 1, 2000)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, AmerenUE hereby requests an amendment to the Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 for Callaway Plant. Upon approval of this request the proposed changes will be incorporated into the Callaway Plant (Updated) Final Safety Analysis Report.

The proposed changes support the planned replacement of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Transformers with new transformers having active automatic Load Tap Changers (LTCs). This design change was evaluated per 10 CFR 50.59 and was determined to constitute an Unreviewed Safety Question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(i) and (ii). Specifically, a failure of the LTC controller, providing an active function to provide acceptable voltages to the safety-related electrical distribution system, could increase the probability of malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, and could create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any evaluated previously in the

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FSAR. (50.59 criteria (a)(2)(i) and (ii) respectively.) However, a new accident is not being created and no radiological consequences are being affected.

AmerenUE has already installed capacitor banks associated with the ESF busses to compensate for low grid voltage. The capacitor banks were evaluated and installed under 10 CFR 50.59 and did not involve an unreviewed safety question. The new transformers with LTCs will work in conjunction with the installed capacitor banks.

Attachment 1 is the required Affidavit. Attachment 2 provides a detailed description of the proposed change and AmerenUE's determination that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration. Attachment 3 provides the existing FSAR pages marked-up to show the proposed change. Attachment 3 includes changes to the Callaway FSAR approved by AmerenUE since the required 10 CFR 50.71(e) update submitted in Reference 2, these pages are designated "OL-12 11/01". FSAR changes regarding the capacitor banks are not considered part of the aforementioned Unreviewed Safety Question. Attachment 4 provides the existing TS Bases pages marked-up to show the proposed change.

This letter identifies the actions committed to by AmerenUE in this submittal. Other statements are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be commitments. Commitments included in this submittal are as follows:


- a. AmerenUE will begin to implement major portions of this modification during Refuel 11, starting on April 7, 2001.
- b. Installation of the load tap changing transformer with the taps fixed is considered a like kind replacement which AmerenUE has evaluated and approved per 10 CFR 50.59.
- c. Administrative controls and/or physical blocks will be implemented to ensure the load tap changers are fixed and not operational until approval of this amendment.
- d. Post-modification testing of the LTCs will be performed during Refuel 11 to support automatic operation of the LTC after amendment approval. If this amendment is not approved prior to the completion of Refuel 11, no further testing will be required. Post modification testing procedures will be developed and evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

AmerenUE requests approval of this proposed License Amendment prior to the beginning of the next refueling outage scheduled for April 7, 2001. Receipt of this Amendment is not required to conduct the outage or to restart the unit following the outage (with tap changers fixed). However, approval of the requested change prior to the outage will allow the load tap changers to operate and enhance availability of offsite power to the Callaway Plant.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), AmerenUE is providing the State of Missouri with a copy of this proposed amendment.

If you should have any questions on the above or attached, please contact Dave Shafer at (314) 554-3104 or Walter Muskopf at (573) 676-4327.

Very truly yours,


for Alan C. Passwater
Manager, Corporate Nuclear Services

ACP/WPM/mib

- Attachments: 1) Affidavit
2) Description of Proposed Changes and Assessment
3) Existing Marked-up FSAR
4) Existing Marked-up Technical Specification Bases pages

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STATE OF MISSOURI)
)
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David Shafer, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath says that he is Supervising Engineer, Corporate Nuclear Services, Regulatory Operations for Union Electric Company; that he has read the foregoing document and knows the content thereof; that he has executed the same for and on behalf of said company with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

By David Shafer
David Shafer
Supervising Engineer,
Regulatory Operations,
Corporate Nuclear Services

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 18th day
of January, 2001.

Gloria J. Taylor

GLORIA J. TAYLOR
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF MISSOURI - CALLAWAY COUNTY
NOTARY SEAL
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES JUNE 21, 2003

ULNRC-04353

ATTACHMENT 2

DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES AND ASSESSMENT

Description of Proposed Changes and Assessment

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This modification will replace the existing Engineered Safety Features Transformers with transformers having automatic load tap changers. This constitutes an Unreviewed Safety question per 10CFR50.59 (a)(2)(i) and (ii)

2.0 DESCRIPTION:

Approval of the proposed amendment would result in the update of the Callaway FSAR to reflect this new feature and associated evaluation. References to the Callaway FSAR are to the FSAR as updated including changes submitted per 10 CFR 50.71(e) in Reference 2 and licensee approved changes hence.

3.0 BACKGROUND

This background information was summarized from LER 99-005 Revision 2, refer to Reference 1.

On August 12, 1999, with the plant in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), the switchyard voltage supplied from the grid was observed to decrease below the minimum operability limit established in station procedures. The Technical Specification action statement for inoperability of both offsite sources was entered, and the Control Area Operator within the Energy Supply Operations Department was contacted to initiate actions to increase switchyard voltage. The Control Area Operator's actions, combined with a decreasing system demand, subsequently restored switchyard voltages above the minimum operability limitation, and the Technical Specification action statement was exited. Both offsite power sources were inoperable for approximately 12 hours.

(Note: "Grid," refers to the North American Eastern Interconnection of which Ameren's Control Area is a part.)

Due to high ambient temperatures, service territory loading was near peak levels. Even at these peak levels, it was predicted that switchyard voltage would remain above the established operability limits based on previous load flow analyses. During investigations to establish the cause for this unanticipated switchyard voltage, engineering reviews determined that large amounts of power were being transported across the grid on the day of this occurrence. This power was being transported from northern utilities to the southern portion of the United States due to a shortfall in generation in that area and a significant weather diversity. The magnitude of the power being transported across the grid had not been previously observed and was far in excess of typical levels. The deregulated wholesale power market contributes to conditions where higher grid power flows are likely to occur. These large flows were observed at this time. Since load flow

analyses had not analyzed this level of system loading, the minimum voltage previously established was not valid for verifying that the offsite source would have adequate capability to supply station loads during a design basis accident.

During plant operations, switchyard voltage indications were not adequate for determining operability of the offsite source in the event the plant should trip offline. Similar grid loading conditions were present on August 10, 1999, the day before the plant tripped. Low switchyard voltages were not observed at that time since Callaway generation was locally supporting grid voltage. Therefore, the capability (with the plant operating) of the offsite source could not be readily verified when the unit was in operation. Offsite source capability is normally confirmed by an analysis that considers the anticipated loading conditions on the grid. With grid loading above these previously analyzed values, the plant was placed in a condition which was outside of its design basis analysis for verifying the offsite source would have adequate capacity to supply station loads during a design basis accident.

The direct cause of the low switchyard voltage was a high service territory demand combined with large amounts of power being transported across the grid. The root cause attributed to this event was not anticipating the simultaneous occurrence of the aforementioned conditions. Widespread high temperatures in the South and lower Midwest, unavailability of generation in the South, and cool temperatures in the North combined together to create conditions for large grid power flows to occur. The deregulated power market used these conditions to transport large amounts of power from the north to the south. These high power flows and high native system loads exceeded the anticipated conditions modeled in the load flow analyses.

Another factor associated with this event was attributed to inadequate administrative controls for ensuring that the design analysis encompassed a sufficient range of grid operating conditions.

The corrective actions taken are as follows:

- 1) Conditions within the grid load flow analysis were revised and the analysis was re-performed. Restrictions on plant electrical lineups were subsequently implemented to support switchyard operability. These actions were implemented to support offsite source operability pending completion of plant modifications that will permit the onsite power distribution system to accommodate a wider range of offsite source voltages.
- 2) A program has been established to periodically review the grid load flow analysis prior to each peak loading season to ensure that anticipated changes in transmission system operation are incorporated into the analysis. Significant

changes in transmission system operating conditions or configuration which occur between review periods are also required to be evaluated to determine potential impacts on the grid load flow analysis.

- 3) Energy Supply Operations has implemented use of an online computer model for determining the adequacy of the grid to support Callaway offsite source operability requirements. The model continuously incorporates real-time measured grid powerflows and voltages, and predicts system conditions for a wide variety of grid contingencies. This model allows for near real time monitoring of the grid to ensure operability requirements of the offsite sources would be satisfied given a loss of Callaway generation.
- 4) Administrative controls have been established between plant staff departments and Energy Supply Operations in order to formalize the process in which the online computer model is utilized when monitoring offsite source operability. These administrative controls also outline the plant's design basis requirements for offsite source voltage and the specific responsibilities of these departments in maintaining offsite source voltage within these limitations.
- 5) Training has been provided to plant staff Operations personnel to enhance operator awareness of off-site source reliability and degraded voltage concerns.
- 6) Plant modifications include installation of capacitor banks and load tap changing transformers (This License Amendment Request) to improve voltage regulation on each of the plant's safety related 4.16 kV buses. These modifications will allow the plant's design basis to be supported by a wider range of offsite source voltages.

A historical review was performed to identify previous timeframes in which system loading conditions may have caused switchyard voltage to decrease below the minimum operability limit had the plant been offline. The timeframe chosen for this evaluation was from September 1997 to present, with a previous plant trip in August of 1995 also included within this evaluation. In addition to the 12 hours of inoperability observed on August 12, 1999 and the 1 hour observed on August 11, 1999, this review yielded an additional 23 hours for which these conditions may have been present. Eleven of these hours were observed across two days in July 1998, with the remaining hours observed across 6 days from late July to mid-August 1999. Both trains of emergency AC power (and their associated support systems) were operable for performing their intended safety function during these timeframes. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was also operable during the above timeframes.

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

4.1.1 Design Description - General:

This modification is affecting the preferred power sources (i.e., the offsite source circuits) to the Class 1E electrical distribution systems. Due to changes in the electrical grid, a wider range of grid voltages is expected in the future. This modification will equip the preferred power sources with the ability to provide acceptable voltages to the safety related electrical distribution system given this wider range of voltages. The replacement of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) transformers XNB01 and XNB02 with new transformers having automatic load tap changers (LTCs) on their secondary windings function along with the capacitor banks, to control the voltage from the preferred off site power sources. Table 1 lists the design parameters of the new ESF transformers with automatic LTCs. The capacitor banks were installed under licensee approval per 10 CFR 50.59.

Per 10CFR50 Appendix A GDC 17 criteria, a design shall be provided to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. As such, physical and electrical separation is provided. The LTC transformers do not share any common electrical or control circuits and cannot be paralleled even if the Class 1E 4.16kV Busses NB01 and NB02 are cross connected. Therefore, the probability that simultaneous failures of both transformers to cause both offsite sources to become inoperable is negligible. Addition of automatic load tap changing ESF transformers will support availability of the preferred offsite circuits and thus reduce the probability of unnecessarily shedding the offsite source and sequencing onto the onsite standby emergency diesel generators.

FSAR Figure 1.2-1 shows the location of the ESF transformers, FSAR Figure 8.3-1 Sheet 1 is a one-line diagram of the electrical distribution system, and FSAR Figure 8.3-3 shows the voltage control system interface with the Emergency Diesel Generator. These Figures are part of the proposed update per 10CFR50.71(e) and are included in Attachment 3. These updated Figures and the text portions of Attachment 3 reflect this license amendment request in the FSAR. The FSAR will be updated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e) based on amendment approval.

Table 1

ESF Transformer Design Specifications

Phases per transformer	3
Frequency	60 Hz
Output at 65° C	12/16 MVA
Cooling Method	OA/FA (Oil Air/Forced Air)
Winding temperature rise by resistance	65° C
Impedance at 12 MVA base	5.35%
High Voltage Winding	13.8 kV
Low Voltage Winding	4.16 kV
Transformer connection High Voltage	Delta
Transformer connection Low Voltage	Grounded wye through resistor
High Voltage Phase relation	Standard HV leads
Low Voltage Phase relation	Lag HV by 30°
High Voltage Winding / Bushing BIL	110 kV (Basic Insulation Level)
Low Voltage Winding / Bushing BIL	75 kV
Neutral End Winding / Bushing BIL	75 kV
High Voltage Insulation Class, kV	15 kV
Low Voltage Insulation Class, kV	5 kV
Neutral Insulation Class, kV	5 kV
High Voltage Taps / Range	4 no-load / $\pm 5\%$ (2.5% steps)
Low Voltage Taps / Range	Auto on-load / $\pm 16\%$ (1% steps)

4.1.2 Station Blackout 10 CFR 50.63:

The new replacement transformers for XNB01 and XNB02 are non-safety related and will be connected to non-safety related capacitor banks NB03 and NB04 using manual full load break switches. The ESF transformers provide the ability to restore the preferred offsite power sources (i.e., SBO recovery). AmerenUE evaluations performed to establish compliance with 10CFR50.63 determined that only transformer XNB02 is required to be included in the SBO program. Replacement transformer XNB01 is associated with train "A", and therefore does not support nor is it required to be classified as Station Blackout Equipment (SBO). Replacement transformer XNB02 is associated with train "B", which is the defined SBO train. The new transformer and associated control equipment will retain an SBO classification. The additional small load placed on station blackout battery PK12 by XNB02 and NB04 will not adversely impact the battery's ability to fulfill its station blackout function.

4.1.3 Fire Protection Design License Condition - C(5)(d)

The new transformer's size and oil volume affects the physical separation design. The transformer oil volume is increasing approximately 2600 gallons and the physical outline is increasing. The existing XNB01 and XNB02 transformer pit design is divided into two main compartments and two sumps. As stated in FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.2.5, the pit is sized to contain oil from the largest transformer served by the pit and the water from two transformer fire protection systems operating for 10 minutes. The larger oil volume affects the margin in the pit sizing. FSAR Table 9.5.1-1 documents that the fire protection water flow rate is designed to be 0.25 gallons per minute per square foot of surface area protected. The larger transformer outline requires a revision to the fire protection deluge system. The transformer pit is designed such that the oil will be contained by the pit even with the additional water from two transformer water spray systems operating for ten minutes in accordance with requirements and is therefore acceptable. This fire protection design meets the Facility Operating License Condition C(5)(d) allowing the licensee to approve the change.

4.1.4 Off-Site Interface:

The existing minimum offsite voltage for the preferred off site power sources required in the Callaway switchyard after a Callaway plant trip is established by AmerenUE load flow analysis (References 7.10, 7.11).

This current minimum voltage is:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|----------|
| 1. Capacitor banks OPERABLE | |
| Both ESF transformers in service | 338.1 kV |
| One ESF transformer in service | 346.0 kV |
| 2. No capacitor banks OPERABLE | |
| Both ESF transformers in service | 348.5 kV |
| One ESF transformer in service | 354.2 kV |

These voltage requirements are kept below the expected grid voltages in order to ensure adequate voltages from the off site power sources. Ameren Services Transmission Planning bi-annually calculates by load flow analysis the expected grid voltage range for peak conditions for Callaway's switchyard in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix A GDC 17 criteria. In addition, the control area operator, AmerenUE Energy Supply Operations (ESO), monitors and models the available system grid voltage, including Callaway's switchyard voltage. Real time transmission system data is collected using a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and then analyzed using a contingency computer. The ESO contingency computer uses the real-time SCADA

system data and defined system failures to predict the final grid system load flows and voltages assuming predicted failures were to occur.

The ESO contingency model includes several defined failures that will help predict the minimum Callaway switchyard voltage after a Callaway plant trip. ESO has assigned a special watch guard alarm with a specific acceptance limit set high enough to help assure that the required minimum switchyard voltage would be available at Callaway following a trip if the predicted grid failures were present.

The replacement Engineered Safety Features transformers XNB01 and XNB02 will include automatic load tap changers on their secondary windings. The new transformers when combined with the previously installed six MVar sized capacitor banks, NB03 and NB04, will help assure that the required minimum safe operating voltage is available at the Class 1E busses under a wider range of grid voltage. This equipment is adding voltage regulation capability to the off-site power sources. The new transformers meet the electrical design requirements of the original transformers.

The automatic load tap changers are capable of varying the voltage at the respective NB bus by $\pm 16\%$ (1% per step with 32 steps), the equivalent of approximately ± 665 Volts at the 4160 Volt level. The load tap changer range will be limited by a gear driven limit switch to a 6% buck and a 4% boost to limit the voltage extremes created by the transformers. Reference 7.10 documents the new Callaway switchyard voltage minimums required with the new transformers, combined with the existing capacitor banks installed. The results are shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Switchyard Voltage Minimums

- | | |
|--|----------|
| 1. Automatic LTCs and capacitor banks OPERABLE | |
| Both ESF transformers in service | 329.8 kV |
| One ESF transformer in service | 332.9 kV |
| 2. Automatic LTCs with taps fixed and capacitor banks OPERABLE | |
| Both ESF transformers in service | 335.7 kV |
| One ESF transformer in service | 344 kV |
| 3. Automatic LTCs OPERABLE and capacitor banks out of service | |
| Both ESF transformers in service | 341.2 kV |
| One ESF transformer in service | 344.3 kV |
| 4. Automatic LTCs with taps fixed and capacitor banks out of service | |
| Both ESF transformers in service | 347.1 kV |

Note: Line up 4 operation is only used in a dual source lineup- one ESF transformer feeding one NB bus for an OPERABLE line up. A single source line up with one ESF transformer feeding two NB busses is allowed, but not considered OPERABLE under this line-up.

4.2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis:

Each transformer is independent and can not be interconnected with the other transformer in any way. The failure of one transformer will have no effect on the operability of the other transformer or Class 1E equipment train. The credible failure mechanisms of the transformers that will have the worst-case effects on the associated Class 1E equipment can be categorized into the following distinct cases:

Case 1 The transformer tap changer control fails low and raises the NB bus voltage unexpectedly.

Case 2 The transformer tap changer control fails high and lowers the NB bus voltage unexpectedly.

Case 3 The tap changer fails to move.

Case 4 The transformer fails or faults which causes the upstream and downstream feeder breakers to the associated 13.8 kV to 4.16 kV transformer to trip.

These cases have been reflected in the update of FSAR Table 8.3-4, "Failure Modes and Effects Analysis," for the Callaway electrical system.

The failure modes and their effect follow:

Case 1 Failure mechanisms that cause the transformer tap changer to fail and raise the NB bus voltage unexpectedly.

- Tap changer control circuit failure mechanisms.
 - The tap changer primary and back-up voltage controllers fail low.
- EXPECTED RESULT--The transformer tap changer goes to full or partial boost. The voltage on the NB bus goes high. When the voltage goes high enough, the voltage at the NG Load Centers goes high and alarm in the Control Room. The capacitor banks will not interact. Gear driven limit switch prevents movement of tap to greater than 4% boost.

Case 2 Failure mechanisms that cause the transformer tap changer to fail and lower the NB bus voltage unexpectedly.

- Tap changer control circuit failure mechanisms.
 - The tap changer primary and back up voltage controllers fail high.
 - The tap changer primary and back-up controller potential transformer fail high.
- EXPECTED RESULT--The transformer tap changer goes to full or partial buck (subtraction) and the NB bus voltage decreases. The capacitor banks will step on to raise voltage dependant on the magnitude of the voltage drop. If the voltage is low enough, alarms are produced in the control room. If the low voltage actuates the Class 1E degraded voltage circuits, after the appropriate time interval, (8 seconds during a LOCA or 119 seconds during non-LOCA) the NB bus(es) are shed from the off-site power system and loaded onto the associated emergency diesel generator. Gear driven limit switch prevents movement of tap to less than 6% buck (subtraction).

Case 3 Failure mechanisms that cause the tap changer to fail to move.

- Tap changer control circuit failure mechanisms.
 - The tap changer primary controller locks up.
 - The tap changer back-up controller fails and blocks the primary controller signals.
 - The tap changer motor or power supply fails.
 - The tap changer primary and back-up controller potential transformers fail low.
 - The primary or secondary fuses for the voltage sensing transformers fail.
- EXPECTED RESULT--The transformer tap changer fails to move. The LTC self test alarm is annunciated through the XFMR trouble annunciator in the control room. The voltage on the NB bus may go high or low dependant on grid voltage changes. If the NB voltage goes high enough, the voltage at the NG Load Centers goes high and alarm in the Control Room. If the NB bus voltage goes low enough, the capacitor banks may step on. If the voltage is still too low, it alarms in the control room and after the appropriate time interval, 8 seconds during a LOCA or 119 seconds during non-LOCA, Class 1E circuits shed the NB bus(es) from the off-site power system and load onto the associated emergency diesel generator.

**Case 4 Failure mechanisms that cause the high side and / or low side
transformer breakers to trip or isolate the transformer from the NB bus.**

- Internal and external faults:
 - Phase to ground short which occurs on the transformer primary 13.8 kV circuits.
 - Phase to phase short which occurs on the transformer primary 13.8 kV circuits
 - A single phase opens on the transformer primary 13.8 kV circuits.
 - Phase to ground short which occurs on the transformer secondary 4.16 kV circuits.
 - Phase to phase short which occurs on the transformer secondary 4.16 kV circuits
 - A single phase opens on the transformer secondary 4.16 kV circuits.
 - A fault internal to the transformer.
- EXPECTED RESULT--The protective relays for the associated NB transformer trip the 13.8 kV transformer feeder breaker and /or low side breaker(s) or Class 1E voltage relays actuate causing a transfer of the Class 1E NB bus to the associated emergency diesel generator. The capacitor bank is isolated along with the transformer.

Review of the failure cases listed above confirms that expected system responses are enveloped by the existing accident analysis except for the bus overvoltage issues in Case 1 and 3. Although not specifically discussed in the FSAR, limited bus overvoltage is analyzed and accepted failure mode when within accepted limits.

4.3 Overvoltage Considerations:

Overvoltage may occur if the Beckwith M-2001B LTC voltage controller fails giving an increase tap signal and the Beckwith back-up control relay M-0329B fails to block and run back the tap changer. This is not a likely occurrence. A Probabilistic Risk Assessment, using manufacturer-provided meantime between failure (MTBF) data for the devices (MTBF 110 years for the primary controller and 296 years for the backup controller), results in an incremental conditional core damage frequency of $1.50\text{E}-8/\text{year}$ based on common cause failure of the primary controllers and the backup controllers. This frequency is three orders of magnitude below the existing core damage frequency. Thus, the design provides overvoltage control and protection whose simultaneous failure probability for both the voltage regulator and the back-up protection relay to fail is sufficiently low so that the overvoltage protection will be assumed to exist and provide protection.

This overvoltage hazard is not new as the grid; main generator and emergency diesel generators may also cause high voltages given component failures. These failures however have not been quantified or discussed in the FSAR and have been accepted as is. These hazards would have a low probability of occurrence.

In addition, design features also exist to identify failures and limit failure duration. These are the following features:

- The voltage controller is provided with a self-test alarm that determines the functionality of the device. This will have annunciation to detect the operational failure.
- The back-up protection relay will identify the controller failure when out-of-control range voltages occur. This is annunciated in the control room.
- The voltage controller and back up control relay are fed from separate potential transformers and fuses.
- The devices separately identify a voltage loss and inhibit voltage raise functions. This condition is identified by annunciation.
- The devices will have periodic testing to ensure their proper operation.

A significant number of nuclear power plant units incorporate the use of automatic load tap changing transformer to supply power to the Class 1E power systems. A number of these sites were contacted. Callaway's design was found to be equivalent or superior to these units. Most of the LTC transformers had been in service since issuance of their plant operating licenses and thus have considerable operating history. No adverse operations, which caused overvoltages in their plants, were noted due to controller failures. Thus, the automatic load tap changing transformer design is not new to the nuclear industry and has not been found to be a credible hazard.

AmerenUE has performed an overvoltage study. Results indicate that at worst case conditions, (high grid voltage, LTC controller failure causing uncontrolled boost, and back up protection relay failure.), equipment damage will not occur for several minutes. Load flow analyses performed for loads present during a loss of coolant accident indicates that the overvoltage hazard will not occur. This overvoltage study combined with the low probability of occurrence seen in the PRA analysis further indicate the overvoltage condition is not a credible new accident.

Furthermore, the LTC failure effects are limited to the associated ESF train, therefore this type of failure meets the definition of a single failure as defined in 10 CFR 50 Appendix A for operation under normal (Non T/S action) conditions.

4.4 System Operation and Coordination:


For normal operation (both LTCs and capacitor banks OPERABLE and both ESF transformers in service), the contingency computer Callaway watch guard alarm is set to approximately 333 kV to provide a 3 kV margin above the new minimum switchyard voltage documented in reference 7.10. The 3 kV margin allows time for ESO to contact the Callaway Control Room and to take actions to restore the minimum grid voltage before it drops below the Callaway operational requirement. Similarly for each possible line-up in Table 2, the ESO watch guard alarm is changed to give an approximate 3 kV margin depending on the plant configuration.

The replacement transformers combined with the existing capacitor banks are part of the offsite power system that provides power with adequate voltage to the safety related NB system. The LTC voltage control system is coordinated with the existing capacitor bank voltage control system. However, they are separate control systems. Each component functions without the other. The transformer voltage control point is coordinated with its associated capacitor bank voltage control point to assure that the capacitor bank steps are off during times that the NB bus is near its nominal 4.16 kV level. Figure 1 represents the voltage operation of the capacitor banks and the LTCs.

The new transformer with automatic load tap changer, in conjunction with the installed 6 MVar capacitor bank, provides voltage support for the associated Class 1E NB bus. This is accomplished by making tap changes, as required, to maintain an acceptable NB bus voltage. The voltage control range for the new transformer will be coordinated with the existing capacitor bank controls as shown in the figure 1 below to assure that the capacitor bank steps are off when the transformer is operating in its nominal control band.

The control of the tap changer will be automatic, based on the secondary voltage of the transformer. The control circuits will be designed to limit the probability of either an under voltage or over voltage failure by using a Beckwith M-2001B primary controller and Beckwith M-0329B backup controller. The Beckwith 2001B is set to control the secondary voltage at $4165 \pm 31.5V$. The Beckwith M-0329B backup relay will block tap changer signals to raise voltage if the secondary voltage is above 4305V and create a tap changer signal to lower voltage if the secondary voltage is above 4375V. The Beckwith M-0329B backup relay will block tap changer signals to lower voltage if the secondary voltage is below 4025V. The first tap change will take a minimum of 2.5 seconds with subsequent steps taking about 2 seconds. Each step will vary the NB bus voltage by approximately 1%. The control settings in Figure 1 are established by load-flow analysis.

Figure 1
LTC and Capacitor Bank Voltage Control



With both systems in operation, the general response to a LOCA is for the capacitor bank to provide a rapid voltage increase if needed and then the LTC will step to correct the voltage back to a 4.16 kV level and thus turn the capacitor bank off. The voltage control systems function to ensure that the voltage at NB01 and NB02 is sufficient to reset the safety related degraded voltage relays and loss of voltage relays before time limits are exceeded. With this, the preferred off site power sources are retained to power the safety related electrical distribution system. The voltage control systems also function to ensure that overvoltages are not present in the safety related electrical distribution system when fed from the preferred power sources.

The transformer automatic load tap changer control circuits, like the capacitor bank control circuits, will be interlocked with its respective Emergency Diesel Generator to "freeze" automatic actions and thereby prevent adverse system interactions during Emergency Diesel Generator testing. A Diesel Generator "freeze" interlock signal will be added to an annunciator window in the Control Room to confirm proper tap changer system interface.

In addition, Control Room annunciators are provided to indicate if the load tap changers or capacitor bank control circuits are not in automatic. Automatic control is needed to obtain the voltage control from the component.

Control Room annunciators will be used to provide indication of system trouble. A multi-point annunciator will be provided at each transformer to allow the quick determination of the cause of the trouble signal.

Operating procedures will address appropriate responses to control room and local annunciators.

Safety related circuit breakers provide the means of disconnecting the transformers from the safety related NB bus in the event of equipment maintenance or failure.

Per 10CFR50 Appendix A GDC 17 criteria, a design shall be provided to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. As such, physical and electrical separation is provided. The LTC transformers do not share any common electrical or control circuits and they cannot be paralleled even if the Class 1E 4.16kV Busses NB01 and NB02 are cross-connected. Therefore, the probability that simultaneous failures of both transformers to cause both offsite sources to become inoperable is negligible.

4.4.1 Manual Operation of LTCs:

The LTC's controller can be operated manually in the event the automatic system fails. This is accomplished locally at the transformers using the local control panel. As seen on FSAR Figure 1.2-1 the transformers are in relatively close proximity to the main control room. Additionally, the tap changers can be manipulated using a hand crank without the control system. However, due to equipment and personnel safety concerns the manufacturer recommends this manual manipulation be performed with the transformer de-energized.

Since the probability of failure of the LTC controllers is very low, the local manual actions are considered to be acceptable given the guidelines of NRC Information Notice 97-078, dated 10/23/97. No timed operator responses are assumed in the design.

Manual actions will be documented in plant operating procedures including normal, off-normal and annunciator response procedures.

As stated in the cover letter, AmerenUE has evaluated and approved installation and operation of the transformers with the automatic LTC fixed per 10 CFR 50.59. This configuration will be implemented in procedures and design documents if this

amendment request is not approved prior to plant restart following Refuel 11. The optimal tap setting has been derived using load flow analysis.

4.5 Testing And Maintenance:

The inspections testing and maintenance described below demonstrate continuing compliance with General Design Criteria 18, Inspection and Testing of Electrical Power Systems. Testing and maintenance discussed below may be modified with appropriate engineering reviews.

4.5.1 Planned Post Modification Testing

The testing described includes all functions required to ensure appropriate operation of the LTC in the automatic mode after the unit is returned to service in manual mode after RF 11, until this amendment request is approved. These tests are performed on out of service equipment. This testing is not considered part of the Unreviewed Safety Question, this test summary is provided for information.

Post modification testing plans include:

ESF Transformers:

- Transformer inspection and core ground test
- Transformer dew point test prior to filling
- Filter and degassification of transformer oil
- Turns ratio verification, all windings
- Insulation power factor testing
- Winding resistance verification
- Sudden pressure relay calibration
- Winding vs oil temperature verification, no load
- Vacuum bleeder test
- Nitrogen gas system test that system maintains pressure
- Thermal switches for fan control and alarm, low and low-low level alarm switches should be checked for proper operation.

Tap Changer:

- Visual inspection
- Operating range verification to design requirements
- Manual handle inhibition of automatic tap changer verification
- Vacuum bottle sensing units should be checked by applying 20 amps current though the sensor and verified that the tap changer does not complete a step but returns to the previous position.

Transformer Controls:

- Scheme checks
- Protective relaying calibration
- Low voltage wiring insulation check per plant procedures

Functional Testing:

- Fan Operation
- Panel heater test
- Sudden pressure and low level relay trip checks trip high and low side breakers
- Transformer control and annunciator functions
- Transformer LTC and Capacitor bank coordination
- Test transformer controls for radio interference.

Energized Tests for Operability:

Modes 5 & 6 Operability Specific Test procedure

Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 complete ESFAS testing procedures performed during Refuel 11:

Testing required for operability of offsite sources for Modes 1, 2, 3, & 4:

- Capacitor bank in service, LTC in manual on -4% tap, perform Safety Injection without Blackout ESFAS test in accordance with ESFAS procedures.
- Capacitor bank in service, LTC in automatic, perform SI without Blackout ESFAS test in accordance with ESFAS procedures.
- LTC in automatic, capacitor bank out of service, perform SI without Blackout ESFAS test in accordance with ESFAS procedures.

Tests with transformers disconnected from ESF bus:

- High and low side controller voltages
- Apply signal to cause LTC to move through range as designed
- Energize associated capacitor bank for 12 hour heat run

Tests with transformers connected to bus:

- Phase check prior to bus connection
- Individual starts of RHR, CCW and ESW pumps
- A high current test should be completed to verify CT phasing and ratio of inputs to the differential relays.

4.5.2 Operational Inspection, Testing to assure continued functionality

- Monthly trending on the transformer gas pressure verses oil temperature is performed.
- Semi-annual oil samples are taken for total gas in oil and fluid analysis

- Semi-annually the transformers are inspected thermographically
- Every other refuel the transformers and bushings are power factored
- Every other refuel the transformer tap changer controls will be operated through out its range
- Every other refuel the capacitor banks will be operated placing all banks in service
- Every other refuel the protective relays and devices on the capacitor banks and transformers are calibrated.
- Every other refuel a trip check is performed verifying the function of the high and low side breakers from manipulation of transformer protective devices.
- Every other year the low and high side transformer cables are megged.

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

5.1 No Significant Hazards Determination

AmerenUE has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed changes by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

Based on the review of the modification details there is an insignificant increase in the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, however there is no increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated. The modification has no effect on the radiological consequences of accidents previously evaluated. Installation of the LTCs does not impact accident initiators though a failure mode has been identified that can increase the probability of malfunction, a risk study shows this risk is insignificant.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The overall effect of the malfunction of the LTC controllers would lead to a loss of the associated ESF bus which is not a new failure mode that can lead to a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated. The LTC failure effects are limited to the associated ESF train, therefore this type of failure meets the definition of a single failure as defined in 10 CFR 50 Appendix A for operation

under normal (Non T/S action) conditions. Additionally, during the 10CFR 50.59 evaluation for the LTCs criteria (a)(2)(ii) with respect to accidents of a different type was not met.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No

The installation of the replacement transformers with load tap changers will help assure the required minimum NB bus voltage established by Reference 7.10 under a wider variation of grid voltage.

Current Technical Specification Bases for the offsite power distribution system are covered in sections B3.8.1—AC Sources - Operating, B3.8.9—Distribution Systems - Operating, B3.8.2—AC Sources - Shutdown, and B3.8.10—Distribution Systems - Shutdown. These bases ensure that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety-related equipment required for: (1) The safe shutdown of the facility, and (2) The mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant AC power and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The ACTIONS sections of the applicable Technical Specifications provide requirements specified for various levels of degradation of the power sources and provide restrictions upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The Operability of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite AC power sources and associated distribution systems operable during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite AC source.

The installation of the transformers with automatic load tap changers reduces the possibility of the loss of the offsite power system due to the increased grid voltage variations as documented in the description of the change in section 4.1.4. Therefore, the installation of the transformers with load tap changers will not reduce the margin of safety.

Conclusion:

Based on the above evaluations, AmerenUE concludes that the activities associated with the above described changes present no significant hazards under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 and that there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change. Moreover, because this change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, it will also not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement as stated in Section 6.

5.2 Regulatory Safety Analysis

Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) regarding the Callaway FSAR continues to be met with the proposed update to the Callaway FSAR in Attachment 3. Additionally, the required level of detail in Attachment 3 has been determined to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e), per the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.70 and 1.181.

Callaway Plant License Condition C(5)(d) allows changes to the Fire Protection Program to be made without prior approval if the change does not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. The analysis reflected in Section 4.1.3 demonstrates compliance of the new design to this criterion.

10 CFR 50.36 sets forth requirements for the Technical Specification contents. AmerenUE has determined that there are no changes to the Technical Specifications as part of the activities related to this Amendment. The existing Technical Specifications testing will demonstrate availability of the off-site power with the new transformers with LTCs.

10 CFR 50.36(a) requires that the Technical Specifications have a summary statement of the bases or reasons for such specifications, but shall not become part of the Technical Specifications. The markups of the Callaway Technical Specification Bases included in Attachment 4 are intended to reflect the new configuration of the Callaway electrical distribution system. These changes are to be implemented in accordance with the Callaway Technical Specification Bases Control Program as stated in Callaway Technical Specification 5.5.14.

10 CFR 50.59 allows licensees to make changes to the facility and procedures described in the FSAR, to conduct tests and experiments not described in the FSAR, as long as these activities do not change Technical Specifications or meet the criteria stated in 10 CFR 50.59 (c)(2). This amendment request is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 due to the criteria of (c)(2)(i) and (ii) are met with respect to the malfunction of equipment important to safety. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 are being met. The automatic LTC feature on the new ESF transformers cannot be operable and in-service without approval of this amendment request. The description added to the Callaway FSAR, Attachment 3, for this amendment (as approved) will ensure 10 CFR 50.59 is applied to future changes to the system.

10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current Power. This requirement continues to be met and was evaluated as stated in Section 4.1.2.

10 CFR 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, GDC 17 Electric Power Systems. As stated in Section 4 the applicable portions of GDC 17 continue to be satisfied by the installation of the new ESF transformers with LTCs.

10 CFR 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, GDC 18 Inspection Testing Electric Power Systems. As stated in Section 4.5 the applicable portions of GDC 18 will continue to be satisfied by testing post modification and preventive maintenance on a continuing basis commensurate with the inspection and testing of the current design.

Analysis:

Applicable regulatory requirements/criteria continue to be met.

Conclusion:

The proposed LAR is in compliance with the above-cited regulations.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION

This amendment request reflects an unreviewed safety question (USQ) associated with the replacement of the ESF transformers with transformers having automatic load tap changers. The USQ is associated with the portions of criteria (a)(2) (i) and (ii) of 10 CFR 50.59 related to the malfunction of equipment important to safety. This modification does not introduce new accidents or affect consequences of accidents or malfunctions.

Section 4.1.3 demonstrates addition of the larger transformers over the retention pit under the transformers will not adversely affect the environment.

These amendment request involves changes with respect to the use of the facility components located within the restricted area, as defined in 10CFR20. AmerenUE has determined that the proposed amendment does not involve:

- (1) A significant hazard consideration, as discussed in Section 5 of this Attachment;
- (2) A significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that that may be released offsite;
- (3) A significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no

environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1	FSAR Chapters 6, "Engineered Safety Features"
7.2	FSAR Chapter 8, "Electric Power"
7.3	FSAR Chapter 15, "Accident Analysis"
7.4	NUREG 830 10/01/81 including supplement 1 to 4, "Callaway Safety Evaluation Report"
7.5	IEEE 279-1976, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
7.6	IEEE 308-1974, "Std Criteria for 1E Power for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
7.7	10CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criteria 17 & 18
7.8	Reg. Guide 1.32 Rev 2, "Criteria for SR Electric Power Sys for Nuclear Power Plants"
7.9	Reg. Guide 1.75 Rev 2, "Physical Independence of Electric Systems"
7.10	AmerenUE calculation ZZ-62, "Load Flows" Revision 007
7.11	AmerenUE calculation ZZ-62, "Load Flows" Revision 006 including addenda
7.12	AmerenUE calculation ZZ-179, "AC Bus Load List" Revision 003
7.13	AmerenUE calculation ZZ-145, "Short Circuit Calculation" Rev. 02
7.14	AmerenUE calculation NB-05 "NB Protective relays" Revision 003
7.15	AmerenUE calculation NG-02 "MCC Circuit Voltage Drop" Rev. 00
7.16	AmerenUE calculation NG-05 "Ctrl Pwr Fuse Coordination" Rev. 00
7.17	Bechtel calculation C-24-01-F "Transformer Vault Layout"
7.18	Bechtel calculation C-24-05-F "Transformer Vaults"
7.19	Bechtel calculation C-24-10-F "Fire Deluge Support Pedestals in Transformer Vaults"
7.20	Bechtel calculation C-24-14-F "Transformer Vault Volume"
7.21	Bechtel calculation E-H-06 "PA Protective Relay Settings" Rev. 008
7.22	Bechtel calculation E-H-07 "PB Protective Relay Settings" Rev. 002
7.23	Bechtel calculation E-H-09 "NG/PG Protective Relay Settings" Rev. 003
7.24	S&P calculation SPJ-02 "Site Protective Relay Settings" Rev. 000
7.25	NRC Generic Issue 171 "Loss of Offsite Power Subsequent to a LOCA"
7.26	NRC 455 th meeting of "Advisory Committee on reactor Safeguards" Sept. 3, 1998
7.27	Letter to D.W. Capone (Manager Nuclear Engineering) from S.M. Hoyt
7.28	RE: "Load Dispatching Order for restoring AC supply to Callaway" dated 3/29/1984
7.29	Bechtel letter to SNUPPS BLSE-13168 dated Jan 19, 1984
7.30	Bechtel letter to SNUPPS BLSE-1851 dated May 28, 1975
7.31	Technical Specification Bases Change Notice 00-029
7.32	FSAR Change Notice 00-045
7.33	Operating License Change Notice OL-1210
7.34	NRC Information Notice 97-078, dated October 23, 1997

8.0 PRECEDENTS

Pacific Gas & Electric Submittal dated, 1/14/98

NRC Amendments: 132 Diablo Canyon 1(DPR-82), 130 Diablo Canyon 2, dated 4/29/99

Illinois Power Submittal dated, 5/20/98

NRC Amendment: 116 Clinton Power Station (NPF-62), dated 10/1/98

These precedents are provided to show recent NRC reviews of design changes relating to the use of load tap changing transformers. Similarities to the above amendments are limited due to grid configurations, multiple unit sites, and electrical system configurations.

ULNRC- 04353

ATTACHMENT 3

**EXISTING MARKED-UP FSAR PAGES
(FSAR CN 00-045)**

List

Standard Plant FSAR:

Page 1.2-14
Page 1.2-15
Figure 1.2-1
Figure 1.2-1 (Revised)
Figure 1.2-44
Figure 1.2-45
Figure 2.2-4
Page 8.1-1
Page 8.1-2
Page 8.1-3
Page 8.1-4
Page 8.1-22
Page 8.2-2
AmerenUE Drawing E-21NB01 (Incorporated by Reference from page 8.2-2)
AmerenUE Drawing E-21NB02 (Incorporated by Reference from page 8.2-2)
Page 8.3-1: Information removed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.181
Page 8.3-2
Page 8.3-3
Page 8.3-3a
Insert 8.3-3a
Page 8.3-4
Page 8.3-5
Table 8.3-4 Sheet 3
Insert 8.3-4(1)
Table 8.3-4 Sheet 4
Insert 8.3-4 (2)
Figure 8.3-1
Figure 8.3-1 (Revised)
Figure 8.3-3
Figure 8.3-3 (Revised)
Page 9.5.1-20
Page 9.5.1-21

Site Addendum FSAR:

Figure 2.1-3
Page 8.2-2

1.2.6.3 Radiation Monitoring System

The liquid and gaseous effluents from the plant are continuously monitored for radioactivity. Release rates are monitored and recorded. The process radiation monitoring system detects radioactivity in fluid systems which is indicative of fuel clad defects and/or fluid leakage between process systems.

Area monitoring stations are provided to measure gamma radiation at selected locations in the plant. Radiation levels, as detected by these monitors, are indicated in the control room, and above normal values are annunciated.

1.2.6.4 Balance-of-Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems

The turbine and generator control systems are designed to regulate generator load. The turbine-generator protection system is designed to ensure safe operation of the unit.

Additional instrumentation and controls allow manual or automatic control of various temperatures, pressures, flows, and liquid levels throughout the plant. Indicators, recorders, annunciators, and the plant computer inform the operating personnel at the equipment location and/or the control room of plant conditions and performance.

1.2.7 PLANT ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM

1.2.7.1 Transmission and Generation Systems

The generating unit is connected to the utility transmission system. The Union Electric Co. transmission system voltage is 345 kV. Union Electric has integrated transmission networks and interconnections with neighboring systems. A description of system network and interconnection is given in Chapter 8.0.

Nominal

The main generator is a General Electric 1,800 rpm, three-phase, 60-cycle synchronous unit. The generator is connected directly to the turbine shaft and is equipped with an excitation system coupled directly to the generator shaft.

Power from the generator is stepped up from 25 kV by the main transformer and supplied by overhead lines to the switchyard. An auxiliary transformer is connected to the main generator through an isolated phase bus duct to supply the auxiliary loads of the plant during power generation.

1.2.7.2 Electric Power Distribution System

Electric power is supplied from the switchyard to the on-site power system for the electrical auxiliaries through two independent circuits. One circuit supplies power through a startup transformer and the other through an engineered safety

features (ESF) transformer. The startup transformer feeds two 13.8-kV busses and a second ESF transformer. Power is supplied to auxiliaries at 13.8 kV, 4.16 kV, 480 V, 480/277 V and 208/120 V ac. Refer to Figure 8.3-1.

The power distribution system includes the Class IE and non-Class IE ac and dc power systems. The Class IE power system supplies equipment used to shut down the reactor and limit the release of radioactive material following a design basis event.

The Class IE ac system consists of two independent and redundant load groups and four independent 120-V vital ac instrumentation and control power supply systems. The load groups include 4.16-kV switchgear, 480-V load centers, and motor control centers.

Two diesel generators are provided as a standby power source, one for each of the two Class IE load groups. Each generator has sufficient capacity to operate all the equipment of one load group, which is necessary to prevent undue risk to public health and safety in the event of a design basis accident.

The non-Class IE ac system includes 13.8-kV switchgear, 4.16-kV switchgear, 480-V load centers, and motor control centers.

The vital ac instrumentation and control power supply systems include battery systems, static inverters, and distribution panels. All voltages listed are nominal values, and all electrical Class IE equipment is designed to accept the expected range in voltage.

The Class IE electrical systems are similar to Class IE systems utilized on many other Bechtel-designed plants since designs that meet the requirements and standards of the nuclear industry develop in a similar manner. The Class IE dc systems and components are similar to the dc systems and components at Palo Verde.

Direct current power for the Class IE dc loads is supplied by four independent Class IE 125-V dc batteries and associated battery chargers. One 250-V and two 125-V non-Class IE batteries and associated battery chargers are also provided to supply 250-V and 125-V dc power for the non-Class IE dc system loads.

1.2.8 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM



Thermal energy that is generated by the NSSS is converted into electrical energy through the steam cycle process by the turbine generator.

The turbine is a tandem-compound, six-flow, four-element, 1,800-rpm unit, having one high-pressure and three low-pressure elements. Combination moisture separator-reheaters are employed to dry and reheat the steam between the high- and low-pressure

MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL
DESIGNATION

MECHANICAL


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ADDITIONAL DETAILS & INFORMATION
FOR DRAWING ABOVE

DOOR NO.	SIZE (CLEAR OPENING)	DOOR NO.	SIZE (CLEAR OPENING)
D-1	3'-6" X 7'-0"	D-28	3'-6" X 7'-0"
D-2	3'-6" X 7'-0"	D-29	3'-6" X 7'-0"
D-3	3'-6" X 7'-0"	D-30	3'-6" X 7'-0"
D-4	3'-6" X 7'-0"	D-31	3'-6" X 7'-0"
D-5	3'-6" X 7'-0"	D-32	3'-6" X 7'-0"
D-6	3'-6" X 7'-0"	D-33	3'-6" X 7'-0"
D-7	3'-6" X 7'-0"	D-34	3'-6" X 7'-0"
D-8	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-9	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-10	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-11	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-12	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-13	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-14	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-15	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-16	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-17	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-18	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-19	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-20	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-21	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-22	3'-6" X 7'-0"		
D-23	3'-6" X 7'-0"		



- 1. AUXILIARY BLDG. HOT MACHINE SHOP
- 2. REACTOR BLDG.
- 3. CONTROL BLDG., COMMUNICATIONS CORRIDOR
- 4. TURBINE BLDG., AUXILIARY BOILER ROOM
- 5. DIESEL GENERATOR BLDG.
- 6. FUEL BLDG.
- 7. RADWASTE BLDG., DRUM STORAGE (SOLID WASTE)
- 8. RADWASTE & PERSONNEL ACCESS TUNNEL

NOTES:

- 1. CIRC. WTR. LINE LAYOUT IS BASED ON A MULTI-PRESSURE CONDENSER.
- 2. EQUIP. IDENTIFIED FOR (1) UNIT.
- 3. ALL ELEVATIONS ARE SHOWN TO TOP OF ROOF SLAB. GROUND FLOOR IS AT EL. 2000'-0", WITH GRADE AT EL. 1994'-0".
- 4. 2'-UNDER BECHTEL SCOPE OF SUPPLY
- 5.

- 6. SEE DETAIL 1 FOR EXPLANATION OF DIMENSIONS TO EXTERIOR WALLS AND COLUMNS.
- 7. BECHTEL SCOPE OF SUPPLY ENDS 5'-0" FROM OUTSIDE OF BUILDING WALLS, INCLUDING TRANSFORMER WIND DRUMS.
- 8. DOOR NUMBERS SHOWN ARE FOR THIS DRAWING ONLY.
- 9. 2'-UNDER BECHTEL SCOPE OF SUPPLY
- 10. WITH THE SWITCHBOARD
- 11. WITH 20 F. TEMPERATURE RISE (R.G. ONLY)
- 12. DASHED LINE SHOWN IS FOR UNDERGROUND FIRE PROTECTION DELUGE (M-H) PIPING FOR TRANSFORMERS.
- 13. RELEASE POINTS ARE TAKEN AT ROOF ELEVATIONS. ALL RELEASE POINTS ARE APPROX. 10'-0" ABOVE ROOF ELEVATIONS.
- 14. FOR INTERFACE PIPING LOCATIONS SEE DWG. M-26006 AND M-26007.
- 15. BUILDING AIR IS EXHAUSTED TO THE ROOF. THIS EXHAUST SYSTEM IS LOCATED WITHIN LOUVERED PENTHOUSES ON THE ROOF.
- 16. M-11-M-14, M-15, AND M-16 REPRESENT THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE ESM SYSTEM AND THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM INSIDE THE POWER BLOCK.
- 17. GENERAL LOCATIONS OF LABELS STATIONS IN CATEGORY I BUILDINGS CAN BE FOUND IN CAP. 65-0343.
- 18. INDICATES EQUIPMENT PERMITTED TO BE LOCATED FROM THE INTERIOR AND NOT BE LOCATED AS SHOWN.

ELECTRICAL

- *E-1 START-UP TRANSFORMER 345KV
- *E-2 SPACING (SEE NOTES)
- *E-3 DUCT BANK FOR CONTROL & INSTRUMENTATION FROM REMOTE SITE BLDGS. AND EQUIP. TO CONTROL BUILDING (E-1)
- *E-4 CABLE RITS FOR 13.8KV 125V DC POWER TO SITE AND SWITCHBOARD PROTECTIVE RELAYS TO E-17
- *E-5 MAIN TRANSFORMERS (BASED ON 13.8KV)
- *E-6 SPACING (SEE NOTES)
- *E-7 SPACING (SEE NOTES)
- *E-8 UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER
- *E-9 CAP TRANSFORMER (13.8KV/10KV) CAPACITOR BANK SITE 20' TO 100' FROM 13.8KV BUS (SEE NOTE 5)
- *E-10 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 1
- *E-11 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 2
- *E-12 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 3
- *E-13 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 4
- *E-14 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 5
- *E-15 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 6
- *E-16 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 7
- *E-17 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 8
- *E-18 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 9
- *E-19 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 10
- *E-20 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 11
- *E-21 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 12
- *E-22 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 13
- *E-23 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 14
- *E-24 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 15
- *E-25 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 16
- *E-26 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 17
- *E-27 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 18
- *E-28 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 19
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- *E-96 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 87
- *E-97 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 88
- *E-98 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 89
- *E-99 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 90
- *E-100 ESM DUCT BANK-SEPARATION GROUP 91


VENT RELEASE POINTS


- *V-1 UNIT VENT (EL. 2000'-0") SEE NOTE 12
- *V-2 TURBINE BUILDING VENT (EL. 2140'-0") SEE NOTE 14
- *V-3 RADWASTE BUILDING VENT (EL. 2055'-0") SEE NOTE 12
- *V-4 STACK FOR DIESEL EXHAUST (TOP EL. 2077'-0")
- *V-5 VENT STACK FOR AUXILIARY COOLER (TOP EL. 2150'-0")

Updated Figure
102-1
FSAR CW 00-05
Wm 1/17/01

REVISIONS

NO.	DATE	BY	CHKD.	APP.
1	10/1/01	Wm		
2	11/1/01	Wm		
3	12/1/01	Wm		
4	1/1/02	Wm		
5	2/1/02	Wm		
6	3/1/02	Wm		
7	4/1/02	Wm		
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83	8/1/08	Wm	</	





ELECTRIC POWER8.1 INTRODUCTION

8.1.1 UTILITY GRID DESCRIPTION

The generator units are connected to the respective transmission systems. The transmission system voltage is 345 kV for Callaway. The utility has integrated transmission networks and interconnections with neighboring systems. A description of the system network and interconnections is given in Section 8.1.1 of the Site Addendum.

8.1.2 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

equipped with an automatic load tap changer

The onsite power system is provided with preferred (offsite) power from the offsite system through two independent and redundant sources of power. One preferred circuit from the switchyard supplies power to a three-winding startup transformer. This startup transformer feeds two medium-voltage 13.8-kV busses and a 13.8/4.16-kV ESF transformer with its associated capacitor bank. The second preferred (offsite) circuit is connected to the second 13.8/4.16-kV ESF transformer with its associated capacitor bank. Each transformer normally supplies its associated medium voltage 4.16-kV Class IE bus. Refer to Figure 8.3-1.

The two 13.8-kV busses supply power to the nonsafety-related auxiliary loads of the unit. The 13.8-kV busses are also connected to a three-winding unit auxiliary transformer, in addition to the startup transformer. The unit auxiliary transformer is connected to the main generator through an isolated phase bus duct.

Two 4.16-kV non-Class IE busses are supplied power from two 13.8-kV busses through two 13.8/4.16-kV station service transformers.

Non-Class IE low-voltage 480-V loads are supplied power from two 13.8-kV busses through 480-V load centers and 480-V motor control centers.

The onsite power system is divided into two separate load groups, each load group consisting of an arrangement of busses, transformers, switching equipment, and loads fed from a common power supply. Power is supplied to auxiliaries at 13.8 kV, 4.16 kV, 480 V, 480/277 V, 208/120 V, 120 V ac, 250 V dc, and 125 V dc.

The onsite standby power system includes the Class IE ac and dc power for equipment used to maintain a cold shutdown of the plant and to mitigate the consequences of a DBA.

Class IE ac system loads are separated into two load groups which are powered from separate ESF transformers or two independent diesel generators (one per load group). Each load group distributes power by a 4.16-kV bus, 480-V load centers, and 480-V motor control centers.

The Class IE dc system provides four separate 125-V dc battery supplies per unit for Class IE controls, instrumentation, power, and control inverters. Refer to Figure 8.3-6.

8.1.3 SAFETY-RELATED LOADS

Refer to Figure 8.3-2 for a listing of loads supplied by the Class IE ac system. Refer to Table 8.3-1 for a list of loads supplied by the Class IE dc system. The loads and their safety functions are identified in the above references.

8.1.4 DESIGN BASES

8.1.4.1 Offsite Power System

8.1.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS ONE - Electrical power from the power grid to the plant site is supplied by two physically independent circuits designed and located so as to minimize the likelihood of simultaneous failure.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS TWO - Each of these independent circuits has the capability to safely shut down the unit. The first preferred circuit, which is connected to the startup transformer, has the capacity to supply the startup and all the auxiliary loads (both group 1 and group 2 simultaneously) of the unit.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS THREE - The second preferred power circuit, which supplies power to the ESF transformer, has the capacity to supply all the safety-related loads of the unit.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS FOUR - The loss of the nuclear unit or the most critical unit on the grid will not result in the loss of offsite power to the Class IE busses.

8.1.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases

POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS ONE - The switchyard power circuit breaker control for 345-kV breakers is designed with duplicate and redundant systems, i.e., two independent battery systems, two trip coils per breaker, and two independent protective relay schemes.

8.1.4.2 Onsite Power SystemFSAR CN 00-045
Δ Wm 1/10/01

8.1.4.2.1 Safety Design Bases

FSAR CN 00-008 incorporated

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS ONE - The onsite power system includes a separate and independent Class IE electric power system for each unit (GDC-17).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS TWO - The onsite Class IE electric power system is divided into two independent load groups, each with its own power supply, busses, transformers, loads, and associated 125-V dc control power. Each load group is independently capable of maintaining the plant in a cold shutdown (GDC-17).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS THREE - One independent diesel generator is provided for each Class IE ac load group in each unit.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS FOUR - No provisions are made for automatic transfer of load groups between redundant power sources.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS FIVE - No portion (ac or dc) of the onsite standby power systems is shared between units (GDC-5).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS SIX - The Class IE electric systems are designed to satisfy the single failure criterion (GDC-17).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS SEVEN - For each of four protection channels, one independent 125-V dc and one 120-V vital ac power source are provided. Batteries are sized for 200 minutes of operation without the support of battery chargers.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS EIGHT - Raceways are not shared by Class IE and non-Class IE cables. However, associated cables connected to Class IE busses are treated as Class IE cables with regard to separation and identification and are run in their related Class IE raceway system.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS NINE - Special identification criteria are applied for Class IE equipment, including cabling and raceways. Refer to Section 8.3.1.3.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS TEN - Separation criteria are applied which establish requirements for preserving the independence of redundant Class IE load groups or power systems. Refer to Section 8.3.1.4.1.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS ELEVEN - Class IE equipment is designed with the capability of being tested periodically (GDC-18).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS TWELVE - Two physically and electrically independent ESF transformers, with associated capacitor banks are provided to supply the Class IE ac electric power system for the Callaway Plant.

equipped with automatic load tap changers,

8.1.4.2.2 Power Generation Design Bases

POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS ONE - A separate non-Class IE dc system is provided for non-Class IE controls and dc motors.

8.1.4.3 Design Criteria, Regulatory Guides, and IEEE Standards

The onsite power system is generally designed in accordance with IEEE Standards 279, 308, 317, 323, 334, 344, 379, 382, 383, 384, 387, 450, and 484.

Compliance with Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.9, 1.22, 1.29, 1.30, 1.32, 1.40, 1.41, 1.47, 1.53, 1.62, 1.63, 1.68, 1.73, 1.75, 1.81, 1.89, 1.93, 1.100, 1.106, 1.108, 1.118, and 1.131 and IEEE Standards 323-1974, 338-1971, 344-1975, 384-1974, 387-1977, 308-1974, and 317-1976 are discussed below:

Refer to Appendix 3A for the applicable revision dates on regulatory guides.

Compliance with General Design Criteria 17 and 18 is discussed in Section 3.1 and Section 8.2 of the Site Addendum FSAR.

REGULATORY GUIDE 1.6, INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN REDUNDANT STANDBY (ONSITE) POWER SOURCES AND BETWEEN THEIR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - The Class IE system is divided into redundant load groups so that loss of any one group will not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. Figure 8.3-1 shows this arrangement.

Each ac load group has connections to two preferred (offsite) power supplies and to a single diesel generator. Each diesel generator is exclusively connected to a single Class IE 4.16-kV load group and has no automatic connection to the redundant load group.

For a discussion of this regulatory guide, with respect to the Class IE dc system, refer to Section 8.3.2.2.1.

No provisions exist for automatic transfer of loads between redundant onsite power supplies.

The diesel generator of one load group cannot be automatically paralleled with the diesel generator of the redundant load group.

Interlocks are provided to assure that a single operator error would not parallel the standby power sources of redundant load groups. Refer to Section 8.3.1.1.3.

REGULATORY GUIDE 1.9, SELECTION OF DIESEL GENERATOR SET CAPACITY FOR STANDBY POWER SUPPLIES - The continuous rating of each diesel generator is greater than the sum of the conservatively

Principal design criteria for these assemblies include the following:

- a. The mechanical design, materials, fabrication, examination, and testing of the pressure-retaining boundary of the electrical penetration assembly, excluding optical fibers, electrical conductors, feed-through connectors, insulation, potting compounds, and gaskets, are in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Subsection NE, for Class MC compounds.
- b. The electrical penetration assembly is designed to meet all the electrical requirements for the specified service environment without dielectric breakdown or overheating.
- c. The electrical penetration assembly is designed to have a total gas leakage rate through its pressure-retaining boundary exclusive of the aperture seal not greater than 1×10^{-6} standard (20°C at one atmosphere of pressure) cubic centimeters per second of dry helium (or equivalent means of measurement) at the maximum specified containment design pressure.
- d. A leak test is performed on each penetration assembly following installation. The test is capable of detecting a leakage rate of 10^{-2} cubic centimeters per second or less of dry nitrogen with maximum containment pressure applied across the penetration assembly pressure barrier seal at ambient temperature.
- e. Each penetration room has a continuous nitrogen supply system manifolded to each penetration assembly. The design and installation of the system facilitates periodic individual penetration assembly gas leak rate testing after installation.
- f. The electrical penetration assembly design is such that safety-related channel separation is maintained.
- g. The penetration assembly design is qualified by testing for the intended service within the service and DBE environment.

is sized to carry its anticipated load continuously, but may be slightly overloaded under certain abnormal conditions. For additional details of the sizing of these components, refer to Section 8.3.1.

The two offsite power circuits are fully testable. Since they are continuously energized and largely passive, they are continuously tested by their use. When one circuit is shutdown, relays, meters, and other instruments can be tested and calibrated as required. *XNB01 and XNB02 LTC control is tested during ESFAS testing.*


Control and instrumentation power for these offsite power circuits is provided by the Non-Class 1E dc system. A dc power source from separate station batteries is provided to each offsite power circuit for control and relaying purposes.

From the above considerations, it is concluded that the installation, sizing, and control of both of the offsite power circuits are designed so as to minimize the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and accident conditions.

For additional details concerning the compliance of the offsite power system with General Design Criteria, refer to Section 3.1.


The instrumentation associated with the offsite ac power system provides sufficient information to determine the system availability at any time.

Drawings E-²1NB01 and E-²1NB02, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagrams for the Safety-Related 4.16-kV Busses NB01 and NB02 show the surveillance details of the ESF transformers and their associated 4.16-kV busses. Table 8.3-4 of the FSAR, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, shows the system failure modes and the method of such failure detection.



FSAR CN 00-045
Modification
Drawing incorporated
by reference into
FSAR Section B.2
w/m 12/20/00

FSAR CN 00-045
Modification
Drawing incorporated
by reference into
FSAR Section 8.2
w/m 12/20/00



DEVICE	DESCRIPTION	REF	TYPE (NOTE 3)	STYLE NO.
13A33	MOTOR OVERCURRENT RELAY	GE	IAC666	121AC66631A
13B	MOTOR GROUND OVERCURRENT RELAY	GE	PJC	12PJC11A11A
13	FEEDER OVERCURRENT RELAY	GE	IAC63	121AC631A003A
1316	FEEDER GROUND OVERCURRENT RELAY	GE	IAC63	121AC631A01A
1317	FEEDER UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY	GE	IAC64	121AC641A1A
132	BUS UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY (10 LOAD SENSITIVE)	GE	MOV	12MOV2481A
44	AMMETER	GE	AB40	50-103131150K
45	AMMETER	GE	AB40	50-103131150K
1318	TRANSFORMER RETRAIL OVERCURRENT RELAY	GE	IAC63	121AC631A003A
1319	TRANSFORMER FAN PRESSURE RELAY	GE	900-1	900-1
1320	TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL RELAY	GE	MO616	MO616-601000751
86	LOCKOUT RELAY	M	HEA	NOTE 12
1321	SYNCHRONIZING CHECK RELAY	GE	GE5	12GE521A
1322	CURRENT TRANSFORMER	GE	412	50-412021110C
41	AMMETER	GE	AB40	50-103131150K
1323	TEST SWITCH	M	PT-1	NOTE 12
W	WHITE LIGHT	GE	ET16	0116AET08C045
Y	VOLTMETER	GE	AB40	50-103021101UL
42	AMMETER	GE	AB40	50-103131150K
PHM	KILOWATT HOUR METER	GE	DSM63	METER WITH 0-12 PULSES PER KWH
53	SYNCHRONIZING SELECTOR SWITCH	GE	2060	2060-0102-A1-001
54	SYNCHROSCOPE	GE	AB40	50-106432A44A
55C	KILOWATT METER	GE	AB40	50-103271AHE
W1	WATT/VAH COMBINATION TRANSFORMER	R15	---	WATT/VAH COMBINATION TRANSFORMER
535	SYNCHRONIZING TRANSFER SWITCH	GE	2060	2060090400-001
1324	FEEDER BREAKER PERMISSIVE CLOSE UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY	GE	MOV	12MOV13053A
AUX CT	AUXILIARY CURRENT TRANSFORMER	GE	---	50104060
2110	TRANSFORMER TANK OIL LEVEL	QUALTRON		032-060-01
2124	LTC TANK OIL LEVEL	REINHOLD		REIN6C12

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FORM NO.	REV.	CLASS 1	
DATE	ISSUED	LOWER MEDIUM VOLTAGE SYSTEM CLASS 1E 4-16KV SINGLE LINE METER AND RELAY DIAGRAM	
NO.	REV.	DATE	BY
138	E-21NB01	5	0
DRAWING NO.		CALCULAY PLANT	
E-21NB01		E-21NB01-107	
UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY		ST. LOUIS, MO	

8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS

The onsite power system is comprised of a standardized portion within the power block and a nonstandardized portion outside of the power block. The electrical power systems within the power block and Class IE nonstandard site portions are described in this section. The non-Class IE electrical power systems outside of the power block are described in Section 8.3 of the Site Addendum.

8.3.1 AC POWER SYSTEMS

8.3.1.1 Description

The onsite ac power system includes a Class IE system and a non-Class IE system.

8.3.1.1.1 Non-Class IE System

The non-Class IE ac system is that part of the power system outside the broken-line enclosures indicated in Figure 8.3-1. The non-Class IE ac system distributes power at 13.8 kV, 4.16 kV, 480 V, and 208/120 V ac for all nonsafety-related loads. The non-Class IE ac system also supplies preferred (offsite) power to the Class IE ac system through two ESF transformers. One ESF transformer is supplied power directly, by one of the preferred power circuits, from the offsite power system. The second ESF transformer is supplied power from one of the secondary windings of the startup transformer. This startup transformer is supplied power from the second preferred power circuit from the offsite power system. Routing of cables from the ESF transformers to the Class IE switchgear is shown on drawings E-OR0224, E-2R3321, E-OR3221, and E-2R3211. Routing of cables from the startup transformer to the 13.8-kV switchgear and from the 13.8-kV switchgear to ESF transformer XNB02 is shown on drawings E-OR0223, E-2R4331, E-2R4321, and E-OR0224. Feeds to ESF transformer XNB01 and the startup transformer are described in the Site Addendum.

The unit auxiliary transformer and the startup transformer each have two secondary windings rated at 13.8 kV.

Two 13.8-kV busses supply power to nonsafety-related loads. Each 13.8-kV bus is connected to a secondary winding of the startup transformer and also to a secondary winding of the unit auxiliary transformer. During starting of the unit, both 13.8-kV busses are supplied power from the startup transformer. The busses are later transferred to the unit auxiliary transformer, during power generation, by a manually initiated transfer. Automatic transfer of the 13.8-kV busses from the unit auxiliary transformer to the startup transformer is provided.

The transfer functions in accordance with the following criteria:

- a. The bus transfer is performed immediately following electrical faults and critical turbine trips (trips immediately hazardous to the turbine) in the generation system, where the generator/network can no longer supply power to the reactor coolant pumps. Critical turbine trips are low vacuum and thrust bearing wear (upper and lower).
- b. The bus transfer is delayed 30 seconds following noncritical turbine generator trips not involving electrical faults. The turbine generator will remain connected to the switchyard during the delayed period to allow the switchyard to supply power to the reactor coolant pump busses for 30 seconds before any transfer is made.

The unit auxiliary and startup transformer has the capacity to supply both non-Class IE and both Class IE load groups simultaneously. Refer to Section 8.1.2 for a definition of load group. Figure 8.3-1 shows the transformers, feeders, busses, and their connections. It also lists all loads directly supplied from each 13.8-kV and 4.16-kV bus.

Two feeders from each of the two 13.8-kV busses supply power to non-Class IE site loads located outside the power block. The maximum load per bus is 21.7 MVA. Loads and power distribution systems are described in detail in Section 8.3.1 of the Site Addendum.

The startup transformer is equipped with two secondary windings, each rated at 13.8 kV, 50 MVA FOA.

The startup transformer, ESF transformers, and their associated feeder cables have all been sized to carry their expected loads continuously. During normal system operation, transformer loads are below the manufacturer's FOA design limitations. Under abnormal system configurations, such as when an ESF or station service transformer is out of service, loads may be transferred to the alternate startup transformer secondary winding. Provisions exist for the automatic transfer of busses PB03/PB04 and for manual transfer of busses NB01/NB02 to their alternate source. Under these conditions, additional loads may be placed on a startup transformer secondary winding. The secondary winding that supplies power to 13.8 kV bus PA02 and ESF transformer XNB02 has been selected for a load analysis.

Analyses have been performed to evaluate the maximum bus and transformer loadings that may result from these transformer failures. Under conditions whereby a station service transformer has failed prior to an accident, the startup transformer

winding supplying XNB02 may be loaded to 56.5 MVA, or 113 percent of its FOA rating. Under conditions whereby an ESF transformer has failed prior to an accident, the same winding may be loaded to 54.3 MVA, or 108 percent of its FOA rating. Under conditions whereby both a station service and an ESF transformer have failed prior to an accident, the subject startup transformer winding may be loaded to 63 MVA, or 126 percent of its FOA rating. These loads represent the maximum credible loads that may be achieved during abnormal system operation.

Using the guidelines of ANSI C57.92-1962, operation of oil-immersed power transformers in an overloaded condition is permissible. Measurable loss of transformer life occurs if the overload is allowed to persist for extended periods of time. For the overload conditions described above, the startup transformer may suffer a .5 percent, .25 percent, and 2 percent loss of life, respectively if the overloads are allowed to persist for 8 hours. This is based on an ambient temperature of 40°C and the conservative assumption that the startup transformer is loaded to 50 percent of its FOA rating prior to the overload.

The protective relays associated with the startup transformer are set above these maximum overload values.

The continuous ampacity of the feeder cables from the startup transformer to the 13.8 kV switchgear PA02 and ESF transformer XNB02 is not exceeded under any loading condition described above.

Each offsite power source (Engineered Safety Features transformers XNB01 and XNB02) is provided with a separate capacitor bank. They do not share any common electrical or control circuits and they cannot be paralleled even if the Class 1E 4.16kV Busses NB01 and NB02 are cross connected. Therefore, the probability that simultaneous failures of both capacitor banks will cause both offsite sources to become inoperable is negligible. Each capacitor bank has the capacity to raise the voltage at its respective NB bus by reducing the inductive losses in the system.

Capacitor banks NB03 and NB04 are non-safety related and are connected to the non-safety related transformers using manual full load break switches. Capacitor bank NB03 is associated with train "A" equipment. Capacitor bank NB04 is associated with train "B" equipment.

Full load break switches NB0301 and NB0401 provide a means of disconnecting the capacitor banks from the transformers for equipment maintenance. Each capacitor bank is interlocked with its respective Emergency Diesel Generator to "freeze" automatic actions and thereby prevent system interactions during Emergency Diesel Generator testing. Each capacitor bank receives an interlock signal from its respective LOCA sequencer to prevent excessive capacitor cycling during sequencer operation.

Control Room annunciation is provided to indicate system trouble, lockout relay trips, and manual control switches out of position. The Diesel Generator "freeze" interlock is annunciated in the Control Room to confirm proper system interface.

Two over voltage protection relays are installed in each capacitor bank control section to protect against NB bus over voltages caused by inadvertent actuation of the capacitor banks.

The credible failure mechanisms of the Capacitor Banks that have the worst-case potential effect on Class 1E equipment can be categorized into three distinct cases. Case 1 is the failure of the capacitor banks to turn on, Case 2 is the failure of the capacitor banks to turn off, and Case 3 is a failure in the capacitor bank that causes the feeder breaker to the associated 13.8 kV to 4.16 kV transformer to trip. A failure modes and effects analysis was performed and appropriate portions are included in Table 8.3-4.

The review of the failure cases listed above confirms that expected system responses are enveloped by the existing accident analysis. Case 2 bus high voltage, is an analyzed and accepted failure case.

This small voltage increase may cause a slight increase in the thermal aging of any energized electric equipment. In order to prevent the aging, two specific design features have been included. The first design feature consists of over voltage Control Room annunciators to NG busses NG01, NG02, NG03, NG04, NG07, and NG08. The second design feature consists of over voltage protection relays in each of the capacitor banks to shut the capacitors off if an over voltage condition is detected.

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INSERT 8.3-3a →

8.3.1.1.2 Class IE AC System

The Class IE ac system is that portion of the onsite power system inside the broken-line enclosures shown in Figure 8.3-1.

The Class IE ac system distributes power at 4.16 kV, 480 V, 208/120 V, and 120 V ac to all safety-related loads. Also, the Class IE ac system supplies certain selected loads which are not safety related but are important to the plant operation. Figure 8.3-2 lists the major safety-related and isolated nonsafety-related loads supplied from the Class IE ac system.

In addition to the above power distribution, the Class IE ac system contains standby power sources which provide the power required for safe shutdown in the event of a loss of the preferred power sources.

The following describes various features of the Class IE systems:

POWER SUPPLY FEEDERS - Each 4.16-kV load group is supplied by two preferred power supply feeders and one diesel generator

INSERT 8.3-3a

The ESF transformers are equipped with automatic on-load tap changers. The automatic load tap changers are capable of varying the voltage at the respective NB bus by $\pm 16\%$ (1% per step with 32 steps), the equivalent of approximately ± 665 Volts at the 4160 Volt level. The load tap changer range is limited by a gear driven limit switch limiting the voltage extremes created by the transformers.

The LTC transformers do not share any common electrical or control circuits and they cannot be paralleled even if the Class 1E 4.16kV Busses NB01 and NB02 are cross connected. Therefore, the probability that simultaneous failures of both transformers to cause both offsite sources to become inoperable is negligible.

The failure of one transformer will have no effect on the operability of the other transformer or Class 1E equipment train. The credible failure mechanisms of the transformers that will have the worst-case effects on the associated Class 1E equipment are summarized on Table 8.3-4.

The control circuits, like the capacitor bank control circuits, are interlocked with its respective Emergency Diesel Generator to "freeze" automatic actions and thereby prevent adverse system interactions during Emergency Diesel Generator testing. A Diesel Generator "freeze" interlock signal annunciator in the Control Room to confirms proper tap changer system interface.

In addition, Control Room annunciators are provided to indicate if the load tap changers or capacitor bank control circuits are not in automatic. Automatic control is needed to obtain the voltage control from these components.

Control Room annunciator provide indication of system trouble. A multi-point annunciator is provided at each transformer to allow the quick determination of the cause of the trouble signal.

With both systems (load tap changers and capacitor banks) in operation, the general response to a voltage decrease is for the capacitor bank to provide a rapid voltage increase if needed, then the LTC will step to correct the voltage back to a 4.16 kV level and thus turn the capacitor bank off.

The voltage control systems function to ensure that the voltage at NB01 and NB02 is sufficient to reset the safety related degraded voltage relays and loss of voltage relays before time limits are exceeded. With this, the preferred off site power sources are retained to power the safety related electrical distribution system. The voltage control systems also function to ensure that overvoltages are not present in the safety related electrical distribution system when fed from the preferred power sources.

(standby) supply feeder. Each 4.16-kV bus supplies motor loads and 4.0-kV/480-V load center transformers with their associated 480-V busses.

BUS ARRANGEMENTS - The Class IE ac system is divided into two redundant load groups per unit (load groups 1 and 2). For each unit, either one of the load groups is capable of providing power to safely reach cold shutdown for that unit. Each ac load group consists of a 4.16-kV bus, 480-V load centers, 480-V motor control centers, and lower voltage ac supplies.

LOADS SUPPLIED FROM EACH BUS - Refer to Figure 8.3-2 for a listing of Class IE system loads and their respective busses.

MANUAL AND AUTOMATIC INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN BUSSES, BUSSES AND LOADS, AND BUSSES AND SUPPLIES - No provisions exist for automatically connecting one Class IE load group to another redundant Class IE load group or for automatically transferring loads between load groups. The incoming preferred power supply associated with a load group can supply the 4.16-kV Class IE bus of the other load group by manual operation of the requisite 4.16-kV circuit breakers when required.

Interlocks are provided that would prevent an operator error that would parallel the standby power sources of redundant load groups.

For a further discussion of interlocks, refer to Section 8.3.1.1.3.

INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN SAFETY-RELATED AND NONSAFETY-RELATED BUSSES - No interconnections are provided between the safety- and nonsafety-related busses. The startup transformer supplies power through the same winding to a 13.8-kV bus and a 13.8/4.16-kV ESF transformer.

REDUNDANT BUS SEPARATION - The Class IE switchgear, load centers, and motor control centers for the redundant load groups are located in separate rooms of the control building and auxiliary building in such a way as to ensure physical separation. Refer to Section 8.3.1.4.1 and Section 8.3.1.1.7 for the criteria governing redundant bus separation.

CLASS IE EQUIPMENT CAPACITIES -

a. 4.16-kV Switchgear

Bus	2000A continuous rating
Incoming breakers	2000A continuous, 350 MVA interrupting

Feeder breakers	1200A continuous, 350 MVA interrupting
-----------------	--

b. 480-V Unit Load Centers

Transformers	1000 kVA, 3 phase, 60-Hz, 4000/480 V
--------------	--------------------------------------

Bus	1600A continuous
Incoming breakers	1600A continuous, 50,000A rms symmetrical interrupting
Feeder breakers	800A continuous, 30,000A rms symmetrical interrupting (with instantaneous trip)
	25,000A rms symmetrical interrupting (without instantaneous trip)

c. 480-V Motor Control Centers

Horizontal bus	600A continuous, 25,000A rms symmetrical
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Vertical bus	300A continuous, 25,000A rms symmetrical
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Breakers (molded case)	25,000A rms symmetrical, minimum interrupting (singly for thermal-magnetic breakers and in combination with a starter for magnetic only breakers)
------------------------	---

AUTOMATIC LOADING AND LOAD SHEDDING - The automatic loading sequence of the Class IE busses is indicated in Figure 8.3-2.

If preferred power is available to the 4.16-kV Class IE bus following a LOCA, the Class IE loads will be started in programmed time increments by the load sequencer. The sequencer provides an interlock signal to the capacitor banks to assure proper system operation and coordination. The emergency standby diesel generator will be automatically started but not connected to the bus. However, in the event that preferred power is lost following a LOCA, the load sequencer will function to shed selected loads and automatically start the associated standby diesel generator (connection of the standby diesel generator to the 4.16-kV Class IE bus is performed by the diesel generator control circuitry). Load sequencers will then function to start the required Class IE loads in programmed time increments.

(and ESF transformer load tap changers)

TABLE 8.3-4 (Sheet 3)

B. FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

<u>Equip. No.</u>	<u>Equip. Name</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Failure Mode</u>	<u>Effect on Subsystem</u>	<u>Method of Failure Detection</u>	<u>Effect on Total System</u>	<u>Causes of Failure</u>
N/A	Offsite power	Provides power to startup xfmr XMR01	Loss of power	Loss of preferred power to xfmr XMR01	Undervoltage relays, volt-meters, lights or undervoltage annunciation.	None-offsite power supplied by alternate source through ESF xfmr XNB01	Offsite system failure, transmission line failure, bus fault, failure of swyd C.B. Low grid voltage.
N/A	Offsite power	Provides power to ESF xfmr XNB01	Loss of power	Loss of preferred power to XNB01	Undervoltage relays, volt meters, lights or undervoltage annunciation	None-offsite power supplied by alternate source through startup xfmr XMR01	Offsite system failure, transmission line failure, bus fault, failure of swyd C.B. Low grid voltage.
XMR01	Startup transformer	Provides preferred power to ESF xfmr XNB02	Fails to provide power	Loss of preferred power to XNB02	Overcurrent, neutral ground overcurrent, and differential relays, fault pressure annunciation; undervoltage annunciation for bus NB02.	None-offsite power supplied by alternate source through ESF xfmr XNB01	Internal fault, lightning arrestor failure, bushing failure, cooling system failure (during startup only)
XNB01	ESF transformer	Provides preferred power to bus NB01 and backup power to bus NB02	Fails to provide power	Loss of preferred power to bus NB01 and backup power to bus NB02	Undervoltage annunciation on bus NB01	None-D-G NE01 energizes NB01 until bkr 152NB0109 is manually closed	Internal fault, bushing failure
<div> <div>→</div> <div> <div>INSERT 8.3-4 (1)</div> </div> </div>					Periodic testing and inspection		
NB03	XNB01 voltage support capacitor bank	Provides voltage support for the NB01 Class 1E bus	Fails to provide voltage support to NB01 Control system fails, provides excessive voltage to NB01	Loss of preferred power to bus NB01 and backup power to bus NB02 Slight overvoltage	UV annunciation on bus NB01 . Periodic testing and inspection Overvoltage annunciation on NG load centers	None D-G NE01 energizes NB01 until bkr 152NB0109 is manually closed. None, short duration overvoltage operation is evaluated	Internal fault, Internal part failure, Loss of control power. Capacitor bank PLC failure.

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
Equip. No.	Equip. Name	Function	Failure Mode	Effect on Subsystem	Method of failure detection	Effect on Total System	Cause of Failure
INSERT 8.3-4 (1)							
	ESF Transformer XNB01 automatic load tap changer (LTC)	Provides voltage support for ESF busses	Controllers fail low	Raises NB bus voltage unexpectedly	Overvoltage Annunciation from NG load centers.	None. Capacitor banks will not interact. Short term overvoltage has been evaluated. Limit device prevents extreme voltage changes. XNB02 offsite power available.	Primary and back-up controllers fail low.
			Control fails high	Lowers NB bus voltage unexpectedly	Undervoltage annunciation	None. Capacitor Banks step on. Eventually degraded voltage circuits shed bus. Loads are transferred to Diesel Generators. XNB02 offsite power available.	Primary and back-up controllers fail high. LTC controller potential transformers fail high
			Tap changer fails to move	NB bus voltage remains as is without LTC control	LTC controller self check causes MCB LTC trouble annunciation. Over/Under Voltage annunciation	None. Voltage will not be adjusted. Can result in overvoltage or undervoltage depending on offsite voltage. Undervoltage may result in load shed. Loads are transferred to Diesel generator. Overvoltage is evaluated. XNB02 offsite power available.	Controller lock-up LTC motor failure LTC potential transformers fail low. Voltage sensing transformer fuses fail.

TABLE 8.3-4 (Sheet 4)

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<u>Equip. No.</u>	<u>Equip. Name</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Failure Mode</u>	<u>Effect on Subsystem</u>	<u>Method of Failure Detection</u>	<u>Effect on Total System</u>	<u>Causes of Failure</u>
XNB02	ESF transformer	Provides preferred power to bus NB02 and backup power to bus NB01	Fails to provide power	Loss of preferred power to bus NB02 and backup power to bus NB01	Undervoltage annunciation on bus NB02 Periodic testing and inspection	None-D-G NE02 energizes NB02 until bkr 152NB0212 is manually closed	Internal fault, bushing failure
D → INSERT 8.3-4(2)							
NB04	XNB02 voltage support capacitor bank	Provides voltage support for the NB02 Class 1E bus	Fails to provide voltage support to NB02 Control system fails, provides excessive voltage to NB02	Loss of preferred power to bus NB02 and backup power to bus NB01 Slight overvoltage	UV annunciation on bus NB02 . Periodic testing and inspection Overvoltage annunciation on NG load centers	None D-G NE01 energizes NB01 until bkr 152NB0212 is manually closed. None, short duration overvoltage operation is evaluated	Internal fault, Internal part failure, Loss of control power. Capacitor bank PLC failure.
252PA0201	1,200-A 13.8-kV N.C. incoming feeder bkr	Provides power to and protects ESF xfmr XNB02	Fails open Fails closed	Loss of preferred power to xfmr XNB02 Swyd bkr isolates xfmr XMR01	Indicating lights, undervoltage annunciation on bus NB02 Periodic testing and inspection	None-D-G NE02 feeds bus NB02 until bkr 152NB0212 is closed None-D-G NE02 feeds bus NB02 until bkr 152NB0212 is closed.	Mechanical failure, relay failure, control power failure
152NB0209	2,000-A, 4.16-kV N.C. breaker	Provides preferred power to and protects bus NB02	Fails open Fails closed	Loss of preferred power to bus NB02 Bus NB02 isolated by N.C. bkr 252PA0201	Indicating lights, undervoltage annunciation on bus NB02 Periodic testing and inspection	Non-bus NB02 supplied by NE02 None-bus NB02 isolated by N.C. bkr 252PA0201; ESF loads fed by L.G.1	Mechanical failure, relay failure, loss of control power
152NB0109	2,000-A, 4.16-kV N.O. breaker	Provides backup power to and protects bus NB01	Fails open Fails closed	Loss of backup power to bus NB01 Bus NB01 isolated by N.C. bkr 252PA0201	Indicating lights, undervoltage annunciation on bus NB01 Periodic testing and inspection	None-backup power to bus NB01 supplied by D-G NE01 None-ESF loads fed by L.G.2	Mechanical failure, relay failure, loss of control power

Equip. No.	Equip. Name	Function	Failure Mode	Effect on Subsystem	Method of failure detection	Effect on Total System	Cause of Failure
INSERT 8.3-4(2)							
	ESF Transformer XNB02 automatic load tap changer (LTC)	Provides voltage support for ESF busses	Controllers fail low	Raises NB bus voltage unexpectedly	Overvoltage Annunciation from NG load centers.	None. Capacitor banks will not interact. Short term overvoltage has been evaluated. Limit device prevents extreme voltage changes. XNB01 offsite power available.	Primary and back-up controllers fail low.
			Control fails high	Lowers NB bus voltage unexpectedly	Undervoltage annunciation	None. Capacitor Banks step on. Eventually degraded voltage circuits shed bus. Loads are transferred to Diesel Generators. XNB01 offsite power available.	Primary and back-up controllers fail high. LTC controller potential transformers fail high
			Tap changer fails to move	NB bus voltage remains as is without LTC control	LTC controller self check causes MCB LTC trouble annunciation. Over/Under Voltage annunciation	None. Voltage will not be adjusted. Can result in overvoltage or undervoltage depending on offsite voltage. Undervoltage may result in load shed. Loads are transferred to Diesel generator. Overvoltage is evaluated. XNB01 offsite power available.	Controller lock-up LTC motor failure LTC potential transformers fail low. Voltage sensing transformer fuses fail.



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
99-1038 E-21001 9 0			
DES. BY	CHK. BY	DATE	REV.
99-1038	E-21001	9 0	0
AS-BUILT CLASS 1			
MAIN SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM			
UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY			
ST. LOUIS, MO			

- NOTES:
1. DELETED.
 2. AUTOMATIC TRANSFER WILL BE INITIATED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING GENERATION SYSTEM FAILURE AND TURBINE TRIP. TRIP DELAY WILL BE 30 SECONDS. SECONDARY TRANSFER WILL BE 30 SECONDS.
 3. THIS CIRCUIT BREAKER SUPPLIES ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER LOADS.
 4. DELETED.
 5. EACH SINGLE PHASE TRANSFORMER WILL BE RATED 300VA, 415V, 1500VA PER PHASE.
 6. SEE DRAWING E-21001.
 7. DELTA CONNECTED STABILIZING WINDING WILL NOT BE INCLUDED ON UNION ELECTRIC TRANSFORMER. PRIMARY WINDING WILL BE RATED 300VA.
 8. ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM WILL BE RATED 1500VA PER PHASE.
 9. TRY SURGE CAPACITORS 400VA, 480V, 1500VA SHALL BE RATED 1500VA PER PHASE.
 10. RETRANSMIT TIME SETTING AT 2 MINUTES.
 11. REQUIREMENTS OF PDIA (PDA).

CLASS 1E BUS PB01		CLASS 1E BUS PB02		CLASS 1E BUS PB03		CLASS 1E BUS PB04	
H.P.	BREAKER NO.	H.P.	BREAKER NO.	H.P.	BREAKER NO.	H.P.	BREAKER NO.
7000	225PA0101	450	152PB0201	1500	152PB0303	500	152PB0401
7000	225PA0102	450	152PB0202	3500	152PB0304	450	152PB0402
7000	225PA0103	600	152PB0203	3500	152PB0305	500	152PB0403
7000	225PA0104	100	152PB0204	3500	152PB0306	500	152PB0404
7000	225PA0105	100	152PB0205	3500	152PB0307	500	152PB0405
7000	225PA0106	100	152PB0206	3500	152PB0308	500	152PB0406
7000	225PA0107	100	152PB0207	3500	152PB0309	500	152PB0407
7000	225PA0108	100	152PB0208	3500	152PB0310	500	152PB0408
7000	225PA0109	100	152PB0209	3500	152PB0311	500	152PB0409
7000	225PA0110	100	152PB0210	3500	152PB0312	500	152PB0410
7000	225PA0111	100	152PB0211	3500	152PB0313	500	152PB0411
7000	225PA0112	100	152PB0212	3500	152PB0314	500	152PB0412
7000	225PA0113	100	152PB0213	3500	152PB0315	500	152PB0413
7000	225PA0114	100	152PB0214	3500	152PB0316	500	152PB0414
7000	225PA0115	100	152PB0215	3500	152PB0317	500	152PB0415
7000	225PA0116	100	152PB0216	3500	152PB0318	500	152PB0416
7000	225PA0117	100	152PB0217	3500	152PB0319	500	152PB0417
7000	225PA0118	100	152PB0218	3500	152PB0320	500	152PB0418
7000	225PA0119	100	152PB0219	3500	152PB0321	500	152PB0419
7000	225PA0120	100	152PB0220	3500	152PB0322	500	152PB0420
7000	225PA0121	100	152PB0221	3500	152PB0323	500	152PB0421
7000	225PA0122	100	152PB0222	3500	152PB0324	500	152PB0422
7000	225PA0123	100	152PB0223	3500	152PB0325	500	152PB0423
7000	225PA0124	100	152PB0224	3500	152PB0326	500	152PB0424
7000	225PA0125	100	152PB0225	3500	152PB0327	500	152PB0425
7000	225PA0126	100	152PB0226	3500	152PB0328	500	152PB0426
7000	225PA0127	100	152PB0227	3500	152PB0329	500	152PB0427
7000	225PA0128	100	152PB0228	3500	152PB0330	500	152PB0428
7000	225PA0129	100	152PB0229	3500	152PB0331	500	152PB0429
7000	225PA0130	100	152PB0230	3500	152PB0332	500	152PB0430
7000	225PA0131	100	152PB0231	3500	152PB0333	500	152PB0431
7000	225PA0132	100	152PB0232	3500	152PB0334	500	152PB0432
7000	225PA0133	100	152PB0233	3500	152PB0335	500	152PB0433
7000	225PA0134	100	152PB0234	3500	152PB0336	500	152PB0434
7000	225PA0135	100	152PB0235	3500	152PB0337	500	152PB0435
7000	225PA0136	100	152PB0236	3500	152PB0338	500	152PB0436
7000	225PA0137	100	152PB0237	3500	152PB0339	500	152PB0437
7000	225PA0138	100	152PB0238	3500	152PB0340	500	152PB0438
7000	225PA0139	100	152PB0239	3500	152PB0341	500	152PB0439
7000	225PA0140	100	152PB0240	3500	152PB0342	500	152PB0440
7000	225PA0141	100	152PB0241	3500	152PB0343	500	152PB0441
7000	225PA0142	100	152PB0242	3500	152PB0344	500	152PB0442
7000	225PA0143	100	152PB0243	3500	152PB0345	500	152PB0443
7000	225PA0144	100	152PB0244	3500	152PB0346	500	152PB0444
7000	225PA0145	100	152PB0245	3500	152PB0347	500	152PB0445
7000	225PA0146	100	152PB0246	3500	152PB0348	500	152PB0446
7000	225PA0147	100	152PB0247	3500	152PB0349	500	152PB0447
7000	225PA0148	100	152PB0248	3500	152PB0350	500	152PB0448
7000	225PA0149	100	152PB0249	3500	152PB0351	500	152PB0449
7000	225PA0150	100	152PB0250	3500	152PB0352	500	152PB0450
7000	225PA0151	100	152PB0251	3500	152PB0353	500	152PB0451
7000	225PA0152	100	152PB0252	3500	152PB0354	500	152PB0452
7000	225PA0153	100	152PB0253	3500	152PB0355	500	152PB0453
7000	225PA0154	100	152PB0254	3500	152PB0356	500	152PB0454
7000	225PA0155	100	152PB0255	3500	152PB0357	500	152PB0455
7000	225PA0156	100	152PB0256	3500	152PB0358	500	152PB0456
7000	225PA0157	100	152PB0257	3500	152PB0359	500	152PB0457
7000	225PA0158	100	152PB0258	3500	152PB0360	500	152PB0458
7000	225PA0159	100	152PB0259	3500	152PB0361	500	152PB0459
7000	225PA0160	100	152PB0260	3500	152PB0362	500	152PB0460
7000	225PA0161	100	152PB0261	3500	152PB0363	500	152PB0461
7000	225PA0162	100	152PB0262	3500	152PB0364	500	152PB0462
7000	225PA0163	100	152PB0263	3500	152PB0365	500	152PB0463
7000	225PA0164	100	152PB0264	3500	152PB0366	500	152PB0464
7000	225PA0165	100	152PB0265	3500	152PB0367	500	152PB0465
7000	225PA0166	100	152PB0266	3500	152PB0368	500	152PB0466
7000	225PA0167	100	152PB0267	3500	152PB0369	500	152PB0467
7000	225PA0168	100	152PB0268	3500	152PB0370	500	152PB0468
7000	225PA0169	100	152PB0269	3500	152PB0371	500	152PB0469
7000	225PA0170	100	152PB0270	3500	152PB0372	500	152PB0470
7000	225PA0171	100	152PB0271	3500	152PB0373	500	152PB0471
7000	225PA0172	100	152PB0272	3500	152PB0374	500	152PB0472
7000	225PA0173	100	152PB0273	3500	152PB0375	500	152PB0473
7000	225PA0174	100	152PB0274	3500	152PB0376	500	152PB0474
7000	225PA0175	100	152PB0275	3500	152PB0377	500	152PB0475
7000	225PA0176	100	152PB0276	3500	152PB0378	500	152PB0476
7000	225PA0177	100	152PB0277	3500	152PB0379	500	152PB0477
7000	225PA0178	100	152PB0278	3500	152PB0380	500	152PB0478
7000	225PA0179	100	152PB0279	3500	152PB0381	500	152PB0479
7000	225PA0180	100	152PB0280	3500	152PB0382	500	152PB0480
7000	225PA0181	100	152PB0281	3500	152PB0383	500	152PB0481
7000	225PA0182	100	152PB0282	3500	152PB0384	500	152PB0482
7000	225PA0183	100	152PB0283	3500	152PB0385	500	152PB0483
7000	225PA0184	100	152PB0284	3500	152PB0386	500	152PB0484
7000	225PA0185	100	152PB0285	3500	152PB0387	500	152PB0485
7000	225PA0186	100	152PB0286	3500	152PB0388	500	152PB0486
7000	225PA0187	100	152PB0287	3500	152PB0389	500	152PB0487
7000	225PA0188	100	152PB0288	3500	152PB0390	500	152PB0488
7000	225PA0189	100	152PB0289	3500	152PB0391	500	152PB0489
7000	225PA0190	100	152PB0290	3500	152PB0392	500	152PB0490
7000	225PA0191	100	152PB0291	3500	152PB0393	500	152PB0491
7000	225PA0192	100	152PB0292	3500	152PB0394	500	152PB0492
7000	225PA0193	100	152PB0293	3500	152PB0395	500	152PB0493
7000	225PA0194	100	152PB0294	3500	152PB0396	500	152PB0494
7000	225PA0195	100	152PB0295	3500	152PB0397	500	152PB0495
7000	225PA0196	100	152PB0296	3500	152PB0398	500	152PB0496
7000	225PA0197	100	152PB0297	3500	152PB0399	500	152PB0497
7000	225PA0198	100	152PB0298	3500	152PB0400	500	152PB0498
7000	225PA0199	100	152PB0299	3500	152PB0401	500	152PB0499
7000	225PA0200	100	152PB0300	3500	152PB0402	500	152PB0500

SCALING RULES (C)10EN27-3

SIZE E



FSAE CN 00-045
Wm 12/0/00
SEE MOD DRAWING
77-1038 E-22ME01-2

REMOTE CONTROL SWITCHES (RL015)
SEE TABLE FOR ALT SW NOS.

NEH55 OFF
RESET PARALLEL

NEH53A OFF
LOWER RAISE
VOLTAGE REGULATOR
AUTO SWITCH
SPRING RETURN
TO OFF

NEH54A OFF
LOWER RAISE
VOLTAGE REGULATOR
MAN. SWITCH
SPRING RETURN
TO OFF

LOCAL CONTROL SWITCHES (NE107)
SEE TABLE FOR ALT SW NOS.

NEH321 OFF
EXCITER SHUTDOWN

NEH322 OFF
VOLT REG SEL SW (LOCAL) RAISE

NEH323 OFF
LOWER RAISE
VOLTAGE REG. AUTO SW
SPRING RETURN
TO OFF

NEH324 OFF
LOWER RAISE
VOLTAGE REG. MAN SW
SPRING RETURN
TO OFF

EQUIPMENT	NEQ	NE02
MASTER TRANSFER SW (NOTED)	KAH3	KAH30A
DESEL START/STOP SW (NOTED)	KAH3A	KAH30B
UNIT PARALLEL SWITCH	NEH55	NEH53A
EXCITER RESET SWITCH	NEH53	NEH52A
EXCITER SHUTDOWN SW	NEH51	NEH52
VOLT REG SEL SW (REMOTE)	NEH51A	NEH51B
VOLT REG SEL SW (LOCAL)	NEH51B	NEH51C
VOLT REG AUTO SW (REMOTE)	NEH51C	NEH51D
VOLT REG AUTO SW (LOCAL)	NEH51D	NEH51E
VOLT REG MAN SW (LOCAL)	NEH51E	NEH51F
VOLT REG MAN SW (LOCAL)	NEH51F	NEH51G
RELAY PANEL - RLY PNL	NE107	NE108
MAIN CONTROL BOARD - MCB	RL015	RL016


NOTES
THE MASTER TRANSFER SWITCH AND DESEL START/STOP SWITCH ARE PART OF THE KD SYSTEM AND APPEAR ON LOGIC DIAGRAM E-21A01.

CALLAWAY PLANT

REV. 01-5
07/94/11/01

FIGURE 8.3-3
LOGIC DIAGRAM STANDBY GENERATOR
EXCITATION CONTROL
(E-22ME01-2)

FSAC CN 00-045
 um 12/19/00



EQUIPMENT	MEM	MEM2
MASTER TRANSFER SW (NOTED)	KHMS	KHMS10
DESEL START/STOP SW (NOTED)	KHMSA	KHMS10A
EXIT PARALLEL SWITCH	NEHS	NEHS6
EXTER RESET SWITCH	NEHS3	NEHS32
EXTER SHUTDOWN SW	NEHS1	NEHS17
VOLT REG SEL SW (NOTED)	NEHS1A	NEHS12A
VOLT REG AUTO (NOTED)	NEHS1B	NEHS12B
VOLT REG AUTO SW (LOCAL)	NEHS13	NEHS14
VOLT REG MAN SW (REMOTE)	NEHS14	NEHS15A
VOLT REG MAN SW (LOCAL)	NEHS15B	NEHS16
RELAY PANEL - RLY P-1A	NEIO	NEIO6
MAIN CONTROL BOARD - P-1A	NEIO1	NEIO15

NOTES
1. THE MASTER TRANSFER SWITCH AND DIESEL START/STOP SWITCH ARE PART OF THE KJ SYSTEM AND APPEAR ON LOGIC DIAGRAM E-22KJ01.

Wgt. Pkg. No.	Quantity Req.	Qty.	380
99-1038	E-22NE01	2	0

[illegible]STANDBY GENERATION
EXCITATION CONTROL
LOGIC DIAGRAM

UTILITY DRAWING NO.	REV.
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SECRET	FORM NO.	RECHTEL DRAWING NO.	REV.
	10466	E-ENGINEER-19	4

- c. Following a fire, the fire dampers are accessible only from that area where they are located. Major other systems and components would be remotely operable from the control room.
- d. All exhaust fans, with the exception of the control building fans, are centrifugal with the motor located outside of the airstream, making them less susceptible to high gas temperatures. The fans are capable of processing air of temperatures at least as high as the fusible link melting temperature (160°F/165°F) of the fire dampers. The control building exhaust fans are vaneaxial with the motors located in the process airstream. The fan motor is designed for a minimum 150°F temperature rise.

Since the exhaust fans are all downstream of the system filter units, they will not be subject to damage from high temperature particles.

9.5.1.2.2.5 Other Fire Protection Features

EMERGENCY LIGHTING - Section 9.5.3 describes the emergency lighting system and the design features provided for post fire access and egress. Table 9.5.3-1 provides a listing of rooms in which operator actions are required for safe shutdown following control room evacuation.

RADIO COMMUNICATION - A portable radio annunciation system will be provided which may be used by the fire brigade and other operations personnel involved in safe plant shutdown.

FIRE RESISTANT AND NONCOMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS - Construction materials are noncombustible to the maximum extent practical. Noncombustible materials are those which have a maximum rating of 25 for smoke contribution, fuel contribution, and flame spread. Insulation over metal roof decking and the vapor barrier will be securely attached by approved noncombustible adhesive and perimeter fastening.

Suspended acoustical ceilings and their supports are of UL listed, noncombustible construction. Insulation for pipes and ducts and their adhesives are noncombustible and UL listed, where practical. Concealed spaces are devoid of combustibles, as practical. Materials which give off toxic fumes when exposed to fire are prohibited. Excluding charcoal adsorbers, all ventilation prefilters for filtration units are UL Class 1.

COMBUSTIBLE OIL - Areas in which combustible oil-filled equipment is located are prepared to eliminate the spread of the combustible oil from the immediate area of the equipment. An enclosed gravel filled pit is located beneath the yard transformers. The pit is sized to contain oil from the largest

INSERT 9.5.1-21

transformer served by the pit, ~~and the~~ water from two transformer water spray systems operating for 10 minutes (unless the pit serves only one transformer). All transformers inside the building are the dry type. A fire barrier of at least 2-hour rating is provided between all oil-filled transformers which are separated by less than 50 feet (except between the station service and start-up transformers which are within 40 feet of each other without requiring a wall).

The underground diesel fuel storage tanks are set on a firm foundation, backfilled with noncorrosive sand surrounding the tank (6 inches minimum) and provided with a covering of 2 feet (minimum) of earth.

Each diesel fuel oil day tank is provided with protection features to preclude the uncontrolled leakage of diesel fuel. The design features provided for the day tank were reviewed and accepted by the NRC at the Wolf Creek Fire Protection Audit of February 6 to 9, 1984. This audit was also applicable to the Callaway Plant.

An oil collection system to collect and contain the lubricating oil for each reactor coolant pump is installed. Two 300-gallon lube oil collection tanks are installed. One tank serves to collect lube oil from either of two pumps. The tanks will be manually drained as required. The hydrogen bulk supply manifold is located out of doors, at an unexposed location.

ION EXCHANGE RESINS - To ignite and to sustain combustion is relatively difficult in ion exchange resins that are in a hydrated form (as opposed to those in dehydrated form).

The ion exchange resins are received and stored in a hydrated form in nonsafety-related areas of the plant (radwaste and turbine buildings) which are separated from the safety-related areas by 3-hour fire barriers. The only safety-related area of the plant which normally contains resins is Fire Area A-8 at elevation 2000 in the auxiliary building. All of the resin, however, is contained in ASME pressure vessels filled with water. Spent resin is sluiced in a closed pipe to the spent resin storage tank in the radwaste building. Fresh resins, still the hydrated form, will be introduced into the resin filler hopper in Room 1307 above the ion exchange vessels from elevation 2026 of the auxiliary building Room 1405. The ion exchange vessels are then filled from the resin filler hopper. Administrative controls will ensure that Room 1405 is separated from adjacent areas by a 3-hour-rated fire barrier, and automatic smoke detection is provided at the ceiling of the room. This zone is within 75 feet of the hose stations in the corridor (Room 1408 - see Figure 9.5.1-2, Sheet 3). Portable extinguishers are installed outside the room in the corridor.

INSERT 9.5.1-21

In addition, the pit is designed such that the oil will be contained with the addition of

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LEGEND**PERMANENT PLANT FACILITIES**

- 100 - AUXILIARY BUILDING, HOT MACHINE SHOP
- 200 - REACTOR BUILDING
- 300 - CONTROL BUILDING, COMMUNICATIONS CORRIDOR
- 400 - TURBINE BUILDING, AUXILIARY BOILER
- 500 - DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING
- 501 - LANDFILL MONITORING WELL #501
- 502 - LANDFILL MONITORING WELL #502
- 600 - FUEL BUILDING
- 700 - RADWASTE BUILDING, DRUM STORAGE
- 801 - STORES II BUILDING
- 802 - PARKING-TRAINING CENTER
- 803 - TRAINING CENTER
- 805 - WATCHMAN GATEHOUSE
- 806 - PARKING OPERATIONAL
- 809 - PARKING VISITORS
- 810 - SECURITY OFFICES
- 811 - ADMINISTRATION/ENGINEERING BUILDING
- 812 - MAIN ENTRANCE
- 813 - SECURITY BUILDING/MAIN ACCESS FACILITY
- 814 - SECURITY DIESEL FUEL TANK
- 815 - SECURITY DIESEL GENERATOR
- 816 - PARKING RESERVED
- 817 - SERVICE BUILDING
- 818 - COOLING WATER CHEMICAL CONTROL
- 819 - SWITCHYARD
- 820 - SWITCHYARD CONTROL BUILDING
- 821 - SECONDARY ACCESS FACILITY
- 822 - REMOTE METER UNIT A,B,C
- 823 - TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER
- 824 - SITE SWITCHGEAR BUILDING
- 825 - SPARK MAIN TRANSFORMER
- 826 - UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER
- 827 - AMMONIA STORAGE TANK
- 828 - SULFURIC ACID STORAGE TANK
- 829 - CAUSTIC STORAGE TANK
- 830 - DEMINERALIZED WATER TANK
- 831 - CONDENSATE WATER TANK
- 832 - CARBON DIOXIDE CO2 STORAGE
- 833 - HYDROGEN STORAGE
- 834 - MAIN TRANSFORMER
- 835 - STATION TRANSFORMER
- 836 - STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER
- 837 - ESP TRANSFORMER
- 838 - EMERGENCY DIESEL FUEL TANK
- 839 - REFUELING WATER TANK
- 840 - REACTOR MAKEUP WATER TANK
- 841 - OXYGEN STORAGE
- 842 - NITROGEN STORAGE
- 843 - CIRC SERVICE WATER PUMPHOUSE
- 844 - CIRC WATER #2504 TANK
- 845 - COOLING TOWER
- 846 - STORES I BUILDING
- 847 - HEALTH PHYSICS CALIBRATION FACILITY
- 848 - ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMPHOUSE (OFFICES)
- 851 - MAINTENANCE TRAINING ANNEX
- 852 - UNS COOLING TOWER I
- 853 - DEMINERALIZED CAUSTIC STORAGE TANK
- 854 - DEMINERALIZED H2SO4 STORAGE TANK
- 855 - DEMINERALIZED CLEAR WELL
- 856 - FIRE PUMPHOUSE
- 857 - DEMINERALIZED POTABLE WATER BUILDING
- 858 - GRAVITY SAND FILTER TANK
- 859 - FIRE WATER STORAGE TANK
- 860 - ACTIVATED CARBON FILTER TANK
- 861 - RECLAIMED OIL STORAGE TANK
- 862 - NEUTRALIZATION TANK
- 863 - EQUALIZATION BASIN
- 864 - AUXILIARY OIL TRANSFER
- 865 - GASOLINE STORAGE TANK
- 866 - SOLVENT STORAGE
- 867 - GAS CYLINDER STORAGE
- 868 - UNS RETENTION POND
- 869 - FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK
- 870 - OILY WASTE TREATMENT AREA
- 871 - SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT
- 872 - WATER TREATMENT CONTROL BUILDING
- 873 - WATER TREATMENT PLANT
- 874 - WELL NO. 3
- 875 - WATER TREATMENT PLANT CLEARWELL
- 876 - SLUDGE PUMP STATION
- 878 - SITE CATHODIC PROTECTION ANNODE BED
- 879 - LCO RADWASTE STORAGE TANK
- 881 - LUBE OIL STORAGE BUILDING
- 882 - CENTRAL PROCESS FACILITY
- 883 - HELPERS PAINT SHOP
- 884 - OUTAGE MAINTENANCE FACILITY
- 886 - VEHICLE DIESEL FUEL STORAGE TANK
- 887 - FOOD VENDOR STORAGE BUILDING
- 888 - FITNESS FOR DUTY BUILDING
- 889 - RAM STORAGE BUILDING
- 890 - MAINTENANCE SHOP ANNEX (FAB SHOP)
- 891 - QUALITY CONTROL BUILDING
- 933 - SAN. LANDFILL (PER. #102704)
- 934 - SAN. LANDFILL (PER. #102702 (202701))
- 935 - SAN. LANDFILL (PER. #102703)
- 936 - DIESEL FUEL REMEDIATION WELL
- 937 - MONITORING WELL
- 938 - PERFORING FALCON HACK
- 939 - SECURITY RESPONSE CENTERS

Capacitor Banks

- OWNER CONTROLLED AREA FENCE
- PROTECTED AREA FENCE
- SWITCHYARD FENCE

NOTE:
1. SEE 8600-0-0043 FOR VEHICLE BARRIER SYSTEM AT PA FENCE.


**CALLAWAY PLANT**

FIGURE 2.1-3
SITE PLAN SHOWING
DETAILED PLANT LAYOUT
(8600-X-88100 - 38)

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8.2.1.2 Plant Site Switchyard and Connections to Onsite Distribution System

The 345-kV Callaway Switchyard consists of circuit breakers, disconnect switches, buses, transformers, and associated equipment. The switchyard is arranged in a modified breaker-and-a-half configuration with the Montgomery-Callaway-7 line connected as a radial circuit on Bus B as shown in Figure 8.2-5.

A 345/13.8-kV Safeguard Transformer is connected directly to each 345-kV bus through a disconnect switch which is capable of interrupting magnetizing current. Safeguard Transformer A is a three-winding transformer rated 60/80/100-MVA which is identical to the Startup Transformer and can be used to replace it if necessary. Safeguard Transformer B is a two-winding transformer rated 30-MVA. Each transformer has two low side breakers connected so that either transformer may supply via underground duct a 13.8/4.16-kV Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Transformer at the plant. The Safeguard Transformers are sized so that either Transformer A or B has the capacity to handle the design shutdown or the design basis LOCA load. The 13.8-kV breakers are electrically interlocked so that the low side windings of the Safeguard Transformers cannot be connected together.

Another offsite supply consists of a 345-kV overhead circuit from the switchyard to the Start-up Transformer. The capacity of the 345-kV circuit to the Start-up Transformer is more than adequate to supply the total connected loads on the Start-up Transformer. A tap off of one of the secondaries of this Start-up Transformer supplies the second ESF Transformer. The two ESF transformers with their associated capacitor banks and supply circuits from the 345-kV Switchyard provide two independent sources of offsite power for the Class 1E buses.

and associated automatic load tap changer Δ

Each ESF Transformer is rated 12/16-MVA and has adequate capacity to supply the maximum loads of both safety-related systems simultaneously during normal and abnormal operating conditions, accident conditions or plant shutdown conditions. Their associated capacitor banks provide voltage correction for the NB busses if required.

The 13.8 kV cables to the ESF Transformers are designed for 16MVA at 95% voltage. The secondary cables are sized for 8MVA per 4 kV Class 1E Bus at 95% voltage. The ampacity and group derating factors of the cables are in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations and IPCEA publication P46-426 for cables in duct banks and maintained spaced trays. The cable ampacities are based on a maximum conductor temperature of 90 degrees C, 100 percent load factor and all cables fully loaded.

The second feeder from the Safeguard Transformer will be used to serve site facilities such as the water intake, demineralizer, service building, stores building, 345-kV switchyard station service, etc., as described in Section 8.3 and shown in Figure 8.3-1.

The physical arrangement of the 345-kV switchyard will be as shown in

ULNRC- 04353

ATTACHMENT 4

**EXISTING MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
BASES PAGES
(TSB CN 00-029)**

LIST

Page B 3.8.1-1
Page B 3.8.1-3
Insert B 3.8.1-3

TSB CN 00-029
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The unit Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist of the offsite power sources (preferred power sources, normal and alternate), and the onsite standby power sources (Train A and Train B diesel generators (DGs)). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.

The onsite Class 1E AC Distribution System is divided into redundant load groups (trains) so that the loss of any one group does not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. Each train has connections to two preferred offsite power sources and a single DG.

Offsite power is supplied to the unit switchyard from the transmission network by three transmission lines. From the switchyard, two electrically and physically separated circuits provide AC power, through ESF transformers, to the 4.16 kV ESF buses. A detailed description of the offsite power network and the circuits to the Class 1E ESF buses is found in the FSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 2).

An offsite circuit consists of all breakers, transformers, switches, interrupting devices, cabling, and controls required to transmit power from the offsite transmission network to the onsite Class 1E ESF buses.

Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the transformer supplying offsite power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Within 1 minute after the initiating signal is received, all automatic and permanently connected loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service via the load sequencer.

The onsite standby power source for each 4.16 kV ESF bus is a dedicated DG. DGs NE01 and NE02 are dedicated to ESF buses NB01 and NB02, respectively. A DG starts automatically on a safety injection (SI) signal (i.e., low pressurizer pressure, steam line pressure or high containment pressure signals) or on an ESF bus undervoltage signal (refer to LCO 3.3.5, "Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation"). After the DG has started, it will automatically tie to its respective bus after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus undervoltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with an SI

(continued)

TSB CN 00-029
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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES
(continued)

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power System and separate and independent DGs for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.

Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.

In addition, one required LSELS per train must be OPERABLE.

Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses.

One offsite circuit consists of either Safeguards Transformer A or B, which is supplied from Switchyard Bus A or B, and feeds through a breaker to ESF transformer XNB01, which, in turn, powers the NB01 ESF bus through its normal feeder breaker or NB02 ESF bus through its alternate feeder breaker, if needed. Another offsite circuit consists of the Startup Transformer, which is normally fed from the Switchyard feeding through breaker PA 0201, to ESF transformer XNB02, which, in turn, powers NB02 ESF bus through its normal feeder breaker and NB01 through its alternate feeder breaker, if needed. ↑

INSERT
B 3.8.1-3

Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This will be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillance, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.

Initiating a DG start upon a detected undervoltage condition, tripping of the incoming offsite power upon a detected undervoltage or degraded voltage condition, shedding of nonessential loads, and proper sequencing

(continued)

INSERT B 3.8.1-3

Voltage regulation equipment consisting of automatic load tap changing ESF transformers and associated capacitor banks maintain the preferred sources in the event of changing switchyard voltage.